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The financial crisis triggered by the bursting of the
US real-estate bubble has spread over the entire world
to different degrees and markedly slowed down world
economic growth in 2008. This year, all major regions
in the world will be in recession. 
In the second half of 2008, economic growth in the
United States became persistently negative. The eco-
nomic slowdown which started to emerge already in
2004 turned into a full-blown recession. For the first
time since 1991, private consumption growth turned
negative on both a quarterly and annual basis. The cri-
sis in the US banking sector reached a new level in
September when the US government decided not to bail
out Lehman Brothers. Although authorities were able
to prevent a bank run, they could not stop the sharp
deterioration in business and consumer sentiment. 
Combining the severity of the financial crisis with the
structurally too low national saving rate and the asso-
ciated too high current account deficits, it is most like-
ly that the US economy will con-
tinue to underperform relative to
other parts of the world and its
own history in the years to come. 
As in many parts of the world, the
sharp hike in commodity prices
pushed inflation in the European
Union higher than expected.
Along with the continuing interna-
tional financial market crisis, this
led to a significantly worse eco-
nomic situation in Europe. This
situation was compounded by the
strength of the euro and the sharp
downturn in property markets in
Ireland, Spain and the United
Kingdom.
The downturn during the second half of 2008 started
to become quite pronounced especially in the large
European economies. Quarterly GDP growth in
Germany, Italy and Spain all declined during the third
quarter of 2008 and basically stagnated in France.
Both orders and production in manufacturing sectors
fell dramatically during recent months. Also future
business outlook and consumer confidence plummet-
ed during this time. The faltering expansion of the
world economy, the continuing fall of property prices
in some European economies and the financial mar-
ket problems will continue to have negative effects on
all European countries. Both the euro area and the
European Union will go through a deep recession this
year. Not until 2010 do we expect quarterly growth
rates to turn positive again.
2. The current situation
2.1 The global economy
After four years of extraordinarily strong growth, the
expansion of the world economy clearly slowed down in
2008. World GDP increased at an average rate of
3.4 percent last year (see Figure 1.1). Especially during
the second half of 2008, the slowdown accelerated more
than expected in our previous EEAG report. The severe
crisis on the international financial markets, which
Figure 1.1started in the United States with the
breakdown of the subprime mort-
gage market in 2007, has spread to
almost all parts of the global econ-
omy. The speed and the magnitude
at which this took place – especially
since autumn of last year – is
unprecedented. The sharp fall in
asset prices caused negative wealth
effects and at the same time indicat-
ed a drop in growth expectations.
On top of that, balance sheet prob-
lems within the banking sector have
meanwhile created severe credit
constraints for firms and house-
holds in several countries. 
The economic climate indicator of
the Ifo World Economic Survey, conducted among
over 1,000 economic experts in about 90 countries,
continued its fall in the most recent survey. The indi-
cator shows that the world economy passed its peak in
autumn 2007 and decelerated throughout 2008. 
In sharp contrast to the early 1990s, when the world
economy also went through a recession, this time all
major regions in the world seem to be moving in par-
allel. The judgements of the current economic situa-
tion in North America, Western Europe, Asia and
Latin America were all still at a neutral or above neu-
tral level at the beginning of 2008 (see Figure 1.2) and
have almost synchronously deteriorated since then. 
Since 1993, i.e., for more than a decade, the inflation
rate for industrial countries has steadily fluctuated at
comfortable levels between 1 and 3 percent. This
markedly changed last year: a rapid increase occurred
during the first half of the year pushing consumer
price inflation levels to above 4 percent during the
summer. After this stronger than expected upsurge,
inflation rates are coming down again. Besides the
turn in the economic cycle, mainly oil and other raw
material prices have caused these relatively strong
fluctuations in inflation rates. Especially the oil price
surged to unprecendented levels, reaching a peak in
July. At the end of the year, it was back again at levels
last seen in 2005 (see Figure 1.3). 
2.2 United States
Up until the second quarter of last year, the US
economy still experienced positive – albeit some-
what lower – growth than it had between 2004 and
2006. Although employment
already started to fall in January,
production did increase and most
of the available business cycle
indicators pointed towards a con-
tinuation of moderate growth.
From a demand-side perspective,
a fiscal stimulus plan of about
170 billion US dollars was able to
keep private consumption growth
positive during the first half of
2008. 
The situation, however, changed
dramatically at the end of the
summer. At least partly due to
strikes at General Motors and
Boeing and hurricane Gustav,
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in August. Also the oil price
surge in the summer began to
dampen demand and produc-
tion in the car and airplane
industries. Finally, and probably
most noteworthy, in September
the US government decided
against a bailout of the invest-
ment bank Lehman Brothers. In
hindsight, this decision brought
the world financial system to a
near collapse. Subsequently,
purchasing manager indexes
and other sentiment indicators
dropped, which pointed to a
further drop in investment
activities. The fall in real-estate
prices, which by that time
appeared to have slowed, accelarated once more;
residential construction activities plummeted again
from already historically low levels. While residen-
tial fixed investment has been falling since the
beginning of 2006, equipment and software invest-
ments also started to decrease early last year.
Most importantly for US growth performance, how-
ever, was the fact that the above-mentioned fiscal
stimulus programme proved unable to stimulate pri-
vate consumption for more than one or two months
(April and May 2008). From June onwards, personal
consumption expenditures declined. In the third
quarter, private consumption decreased for the first
time since 1991, and consumption continued to
decline for the rest of the year. Especially consump-
tion of durable goods faced a
sharp drop.
Consequently, last year's quar-
terly GDP growth turned nega-
tive by an annualised 0.5 and
3.8 percent in the third and
fourth quarter, respectively.
Using the common definition of a recession to be a
situation in which GDP growth turns negative for at
least two quarters in a row, the United States has
been in a recession ever since.1
The deflating of the housing price bubble continued
throughout the year (see Figure 1.4). National house
price indexes decreased by close to 25 percent since
their highest levels in summer 2006. Furthermore,
other indicators for the real estate market in the
United States, like house sales and new privately
owned home construction, are at historical lows. As a
consequence, residential investment continued to fall
at double-digit rates throughout the year. Thus far,
only non-residential construction investment has con-
tinued to grow. 
1 According to the Business Cycle Dating
Committee of the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER), the US
economy has been in recession since the
beginning of 2008. In their view “a reces-
sion is a significant decline in economic
activity spread across the economy, lasting
more than a few months, normally visible
in production, employment, real income,
and other indicators.” Especially labour
market indicators are the reason why they
decided on January 2008 as the start of the
recession, the last peak month having been
December 2007.
Figure 1.4
Figure 1.5At the same time mortgage default rates have risen,
and banks have tightened their lending rules for
households and firms. As a result, growth in mortgage
debt has now slowed down to levels last seen at the
beginning of the 1970s.
The depreciation of the US dollar during the first half
of 2008 improved the external trade situation in the
United States (see Figure 1.5). Export growth surged
at 12.3 percent in the second quarter and exports
managed to keep on growing in the second half of the
year – albeit at a slower pace. On the other hand,
imports have been shrinking for five consecutive quar-
ters now. Net exports were thus the most important
growth engine for the US economy last year. 
The slowdown in economic activity also became visi-
ble on the labour market. Since the beginning of last
year, the number of employed persons has dropped by
more than 2.6 million. This decline in employment
ranges over most sectors but in particular the con-
struction, manufacturing and transport sectors. As a
result, the rate of unemployment rose to 7.2 percent in
December last year, the highest level in 14 years.
Despite the strong deterioration of labour market
conditions, nominal wages continued to develop quite
robustly. Average nominal hourly wage rates for the
non-agricultural part of the economy were 2.6 percent
higher than the year before. Correcting for the tax
rebates in the second quarter, this implies that real dis-
posable income, which is by far the most important
determinant of private consumption expenditures, is
still rising, albeit moderately. 
Primarily due to temporary tax relief, the savings rate
(personal saving as percentage of disposable personal
income) increased from basically zero percent in the
previous quarters to 2.5 percent in the second quarter.
At a rate of 1.1 percent in the third quarter, the saving
rate was still above levels we have seen in previous
years.
The budget deficit in fiscal 2008, which ended at the
end of September last year, increased to 455 billion
US dollars, i.e., 3.3 percent of GDP, as a result of
both lower revenues as well as increased expenditures.
The strongest decline on the income side was due to
the fall in corporate taxation as a consequence of
reduced firm profits. At the same time, the increase in
expenditures by 9 percent was the highest since 1990.
Besides increased military expenditures due to US
engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular the
tax rebates intended to support private consumption
and the involvement in eight large US banks have put
their burden on the government budget.
For fiscal 2009 and as a reaction to the persistent cri-
sis in the banking and financial systems, the US gov-
ernment decided to implement a sizeable rescue pack-
age and enacted on 3 October 2008 the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. This created the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a 700 billion
dollar fund aimed at resuscitating the US financial
system. The funds are used to provide guarantees for
banks and other financial institutes as well as to pur-
chase nonliquid, difficult-to-value assets (“toxic
assets”) from these institutions up to the end of 2009.
Its purpose is to facilitate the restructuring of balance
sheets and to strengthen confidence and trust in the
banking system. 
Strong increases in energy prices caused the inflation
rate to reach its highest level since the early 1990s with
5.6 percent in July 2008. Since then, it has noticeably
sunk and reached 0.1 percent in December. The core
inflation rate – the rate preferred by the Federal
Reserve for assessing monetary policy – did not show
these large fluctuations and most of time remained
slightly above 2 percent last year, the level the Federal
Reserve considers to be acceptable. 
The financial crisis led the Federal Reserve to cut their
target rate from 5.25 percent in September 2007 to
only 0.25 percent at the end of last year. The first six
steps took place at the end of 2007 and early 2008.
After a pause throughout spring and summer, three
additional cuts followed at the end of last year. 
2.3 Japan, China, India and other Asian countries
Since the second quarter of last year the Japanese
economy has been shrinking. GDP fell by 1.8 percent
in the third quarter after it already sank by 3.7 percent
the quarter before. Private consumption growth weak-
ened but remained quite resilient throughout the year.
However, the main reason for the fall in GDP was the
negative growth contribution of net exports. As a con-
sequence, export-oriented firms facing the gloomy
worldwide outlook drastically cut their fixed capital
investments for four consecutive quarters.
Whereas the direct consequences of the financial cri-
sis on Japan have so far been relatively moderate, the
deteroriation of the world economic outlook appears
to be more dramatic for the largest economy in Asia.
EEAG Report 2009 14
Chapter 1EEAG Report 2009 15
Chapter 1
The upswing during the last few years has been large-
ly based upon foreign trade. Exports to China have
been stagnating for most of the second half of 2008
and eventually started to fall towards the end of the
year. They could thus no longer compensate the
falling exports to Europe and especially the United
States as still was the case during the first half of last
year. The sharp appreciation of the yen and the fall in
import prices caused by the worldwide reduction in
raw material prices have stimulated imports in the
third quarter. Consequently, the growth contribution
of net exports turned negative.
Weak business cycle conditions induced the Bank of
Japan to lower its target for the uncollateralized
overnight call rate twice in the last months of 2008 by
a total of 40 basis points to 0.1 percent now. These
were the first interest rate cuts in Japan since 2001.
The inflation rate slowed to 1.0 percent in November
amid falling energy prices. On average it will reach
1.4 percent for the year 2008. 
The labour market situation has started to deteriorate
somewhat since the beginning of 2008. The number of
employed persons fell and the unemployment rate
edged up to 4.1 percent in 2008 (as compared to 3.9
percent the year before). Nominal wages hardly
increased while in real terms they actually decreased
somewhat, reflecting the price increases since the
beginning of 2008. 
Also in China the economic expansion has cooled
off. GDP increased by “only” about 9.4 percent last
year as compared to 11.9 percent in 2007. This slow-
down especially took place during the second half
of 2008 with annual growth moderating from a peak
of 12.6 percent mid 2007 to 9 percent in the third
quarter.
In particular industrial production, which contributes
about half of GDP, showed a perceptibly weaker
expansion. In addition to production closures during
the Olympic Games, primarily reduced growth in
export orders caused by the world economic slow-
down was responsible for this development. It was
further intensified by the deteriorating price competi-
tiveness of the Chinese economy. In real effective
terms, the Chinese currency appreciated by about
15 percent since the start of 2008. Most segments of
the domestic economy, notably consumption, seem to
have held up reasonably well so far and thus managed
to partly compensate for this decline in external
demand.
The direct effects of the international financial crisis
on the Chinese banking system have been quite limit-
ed up to now. Chinese banks have hardly been
involved in the US mortgage market and face relative-
ly strict financial controls. Nevertheless, stock market
indexes have plummeted by about 50 percent since the
beginning of last year.
Partly due to the still relatively restrictive monetary
conditions during the first part of 2008, investment
has started to become less dynamic. In particular, the
real estate market, which already threatened to over-
heat, has begun to cool off noticeably. Thus, the rise
in house prices has clearly started to slow and house
sales are falling. A collapse of the real estate market
could seriously affect the already staggering Chinese
economy.
For that reason, monetary policy changed course dur-
ing the second half of last year and the People’s Bank
of China have reduced target rates and reserve-re-
quirement ratios in several steps since autumn. 
After four years of strong economic growth, the econ-
omy of India started to slow last year. In the spring of
2008, the country still had the lowest inflation rate of
the big emerging economies. During the summer,
however, consumer inflation rates doubled to about
9 percent, and growth in wholesale prices even tripled
to more than 12 percent. Besides the high raw material
prices on the world market, crop failures due to bad
weather were the main cause of these price-propelling
effects. Furthermore, the strong devaluation of the
rupee induced a sharp increase in import prices.
During the last months of last year and driven by
sharply lower commodity prices, inflation started to
slow down again.
On the other hand, during the first half of 2008
exports grew by 15 percent as compared to the first
half of 2007, benefitting from the relatively lower
prices of Indian products on world markets.
Furthermore, strong wage increases and higher for-
eign remittances boosted private consumption. 
Initially higher interest rates triggered by the upsurge
in inflation already caused investment dynamics to
slow down early in the year. On balance, industry,
construction and the service sector already showed
lower growth rates since the start of 2007. Only
income in the agricultural sector – which amounts to
18 percent of GDP – benefited from the higher agri-
cultural prices on the world market during the first
half of last year.Latest data show that economic
activity slowed significantly dur-
ing the second half of 2008.
Corporate profits fell sharply,
while a fall-off in spending on
consumer durables, such as cars,
augurs ill for private consump-
tion growth. Furthermore, capi-
tal flows are reversing.
The weakening of the economy
induced the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) to start easing mon-
etary policy by reducing restric-
tions on lending to the property
sector, raising the limit on export
credit finance available to banks
and cutting key interest rates. In
an attempt to mitigate the impact of large capital
outflows, the RBI is trying to encourage deposits
from non-resident Indians and is considering liberal-
ising restrictions on foreign direct investment.
Nevertheless, GDP growth will be reduced by 2 per-
centage points as compared to the last two years and
will reach a level of 7 percent in 2008.
As in Japan and India, the economic growth in the
rest of Asia (which includes Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the  Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand) is quite dependent upon devel-
opments in the United States. The correlation
between the economic development in this region and
that of the United States has been quite high and sta-
ble for several years. Despite this correlation, the
growth differential between these two regions has
clearly increased since 2005. Whereas Asia (excl.
Japan and India) experienced about 3.5 percentage
points higher growth than the United States in the
period 1999–2004, this growth differential has
increased to approximately 6 percentage points since
then.2 Improved fiscal budgets and net foreign
exchange reserves have increased the likelihood that –
despite the high correlation – the growth differential
will prove to be persistent (see Figure 1.6).
This group of emerging economies in Asia initially
continued their upswing during the first half of 2008
and have since experienced diverse developments.
While most of the economies have only seen moderate
declines in their growth rates so far, others, most
notably Singapore, has shown a more virulent slow-
down or has already gone into recession. 
Inflation tended to increase in most of these countries
throughout most of 2008. One of the reasons was the
reduction in energy subsidies, which previously damp-
ened the domestic price increase. The overall decline
in raw material prices has already started to reduce
inflation to some degree. However, the sharp increase
in the core inflation rate since the beginning of the
year indicates that second-round effects cannot be
completely ruled out yet. Nevertheless, monetary
policies throughout most East Asian economies
turned sharply over the final months of 2008, as the
focus shifted from concerns about inflation to growth
prospects.
Except for South Korea, consumption growth slowed
down due to both higher inflation rates and increased
import prices (both reducing real income).
Meanwhile, exports have remained relatively robust
for some time. The depreciation of some currencies
and an intensification of trade within Asia have been
able to soften the effects of reduced demand from
western countries.
Largely driven by ongoing, strong import growth, the
trade surpluses and the growth contributions of net
exports decreased substantially. Especially imports of
investment goods remained quite robust in most of
these economies. Overall, GDP growth declined by
1 percentage point as compared to 2007 and reached
4.5 percent in 2008.
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2 Neither including India nor Japan alters this conclusion: the growth
differential has increased by an average of about 2 percentage points
after 2004. 
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In general emerging markets have so far been able to
play a stabilising role in the current crisis. Although,
their savings allowed the huge US current account
deficit and consequently the US consumer boom to be
possible in the first place, it is precisely the reserves
they have built up that are now helping to stabilise the
global economy. For example, they are preventing any
renewed build-up in speculation against Asian curren-
cies. The budget surpluses that have been accumulat-
ed over the years are now being used to prevent a
sharp downturn in domestic demand. In addition,
continued demand from emerging markets has helped
dampen an even sharper downturn in exports from
industrialised nations. The sovereign wealth funds of
emerging countries have also been buying up financial
stocks in Europe and the United States, which has
helped to avert numerous bankruptcies.
2.4 The rest of the world
Although growth weakened in the Latin American
region (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Venezuela) during the second half of last year,
annual rates in general stayed well above 4 percent. As
in the previous year, the only exception was Mexico: it
suffered from its dependence upon the US economy.
During the first part of the year most countries still
benefited from the high raw material prices. However,
in particular for the net exporters of energy, raw mate-
rials and food, the tide changed radically during the
second half of 2008 when commodity prices tumbled
from record highs and financing conditions worsened
sharply.
The surge of inflation especially due to increased food
prices led central banks in the region to tighten mon-
etary policy. In the meantime, the financial crisis has
put an end to this and interest rate cuts have already
been implemented.
In most of the Latin American economies the fiscal
situation has clearly improved in recent years. For
instance, Brazil’s primary fiscal surplus amounted to
approximately 4 percent of GDP last year. This will
give governments some leeway to soften the conse-
quences of the global crisis, which is increasingly
spreading to this region as well.
During the first half of the year total production in
Russia continued to expand strongly. In particular,
domestic demand was responsible for this. Whereas
consumption was able to hold up reasonably well,
investment was no longer able to reach double-digit
growth rates. The increased inflation rate was mainly
responsible for this. Furthermore, the financial crisis
made it more problematic to finance new projects. 
During the past years it was mainly external capital
that financed new firm activities, with an increasing
share of loans denominated in foreign currencies. This
financing form continued to grow during the first
half-year of 2008. Beginning with the conflict in
Georgia and the intensification of the credit crisis,
investor sentiment changed and Russia had to cope
with massive outflows of capital. In addition, reduced
external demand, especially from Europe, worsening
terms of trade conditions, and still growing imports
caused net exports to fall considerably.
The consumer price level continued to rise by double-
digit rates last year. The persistent inflation trend was
not only caused by rising food prices but is also due to
the strong expansion of the money supply. High for-
eign exchange receipts from oil exports have been used
to finance the expansionary financial policy stance.
During the first half of the year, the Russian central
bank reacted to the inflationary environment by in-
creasing base rates. 
Monetary policy changed course in autumn when
financial turbulence reached the Russian banking sec-
tor. The central bank intervened in the money market,
was forced to cut the minimum reserve requirements
and the stock exchange was temporarily closed down.
Furthermore, the high volatility on foreign exchange
markets caused the Russian central bank to widen the
rouble trading corridor several times, while continu-
ing to spend substantial amounts of foreign-exchange
reserves to try to prevent a larger devaluation. During
the second half of the year, foreign exchange reserves
fell by over 150 billion US dollars.
2.5 The European economy
After a still relatively positive outlook at the begin-
ning of last year, the economic climate deteriorated
markedly as the year progressed. The turbulence on
international financial markets as well as the collapse
in sentiment seen within the industrial sector and
amongst consumers throughout Europe in the second
half of the year have increasingly been reflected by
data on real economic output.
Real GDP sank 0.8 percent in the third quarter with-
in the European Union (EU27). A decline in produc-
tion was also reported for the previous quarter. Thefigures were the worst since the
data was first recorded in 1995.
Given that most available indica-
tors report negative growth for
the last quarter of 2008 and the
first quarter of this year, the
European economy has been in
recession since the second quar-
ter of last year. At present, most
member countries face negative
growth. This means that unlike in
the past, national demand short-
falls will not be offset by growth
in other countries and final
domestic demand in the Euro-
pean Union has reached an all-
time low (see Figure 1.7).
However, the downturn is not
affecting all parts of the Euro-
pean economy to the same ex-
tent. Indeed, there is a distinction
between individual industrial sec-
tors and their respective operat-
ing conditions. Following the
financial sector and the construc-
tion sector in some EU member
countries, the automobile indus-
try is also finding itself struggling
to cope with a massive drop in
global demand. Production of
motor vehicles and motor vehicle
components in Germany in Octo-
ber, for example, fell by 13.2 per-
cent in year-on-year terms, and
incoming orders shrank by a size-
able 32.8 percent in November.
Further declines, which will also
impact the supplier industry,
appear unavoidable.
After a still positive growth in the
first quarter, investment plum-
meted in the remainder of last
year (see Figure 1.8). Especially
in those countries facing a sharp
downturn in the property market,
in particular Ireland, Spain and
the United Kingdom, there have
been large falls in residential
investment spending throughout
the year. (The drop in sentiment
indicators was followed by a
rapid deterioration in non-resi-
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dential investment spending,
which deteriorated quickly dur-
ing the second half of last year.)
Given the high investment levels
at the beginning of last year, the
annual growth rate for 2008 for
the EU27 nevertheless remained
slightly positive. 
Whereas private consumption
was still an important pillar for
economic growth in Europe in
2007, it basically stagnated in
2008. Initially, this was especially
due to a fall in consumer spend-
ing in Germany caused by in-
creased inflation rates during the
first quarters, slowly deteriorat-
ing labour market conditions and sharply deteriorat-
ing financial prospects. However, quickly falling infla-
tion rates (positively affecting real income develop-
ment) at the end of last year allowed consumption to
pick up again slowly. 
Despite the strength of the euro, net exports con-
tributed positively to GDP growth in the European
Union last year. The slowdown in export growth was
met by a comparable fall in import growth rates. Only
at the end of the year did the trade surplus start to fall
as imports grew somewhat faster. 
Employment kept growing in the European Union
throughout last year – albeit at a continuously slower
pace. With the increase in the labour force, however,
the unemployment rate reached its lowest rate of
6.8 percent during the first quarter last year.
Thereafter it steadily increased to 7.2 percent in
November.
Temporarily, the increase in prices accelerated notice-
ably in the entire European Union during the first
part of 2008 (see Figure 1.9). The inflation rate – mea-
sured by the harmonised index of consumer prices
(HICP) – increased from 3.4 percent in January to
4.4 percent in July. Above all, this was induced by the
strong increase in oil prices observed in the first half-
year of the year. Oil prices started to fall in the mid-
dle of July. Subsequently, the official inflation rate
decreased to 2.8 percent in November. Although less
dynamically than in 2007, core inflation (the growth
in the HICP excluding energy and crude food) contin-
ued to increase until reaching a peak of 2.9 percent in
August. Since then it reversed and slowed down to
2.5 percent in November.
Against the backdrop of moderate wage growth and
favourable economic conditions in the past years,
nominal wage increase accelerated last year in the
euro area. Average compensation per employee grew
by 3 percent in the private sector (as compared to
2 percent on average during 2005–2007). As the eco-
nomic situation started to deteriorate relatively early
in the United Kingdom, one of the major economies
in Europe, wage growth already lost some momentum
last year. Given that consumer prices increased by
3.3 percent in the euro area and 3.7 percent in the
United Kingdom, this implies that real wages declined
last year. From a supply-side perspective, real wage
compensation still increased somewhat in the euro
area as the GDP deflator did not go up by as much as
the consumer price index. Although growth in real
wage compensation cost was kept below that of the
United States and Japan, the lower productivity
growth in the euro area also dominated when calcu-
lating unit labour costs (see Table 1.1). 
After two years of high growth and an exceptionally
high growth rate in the first quarter of last year, the
German economy fell into recession. Whereas high
inflation caused consumption to fall during the first
half of the year, it managed to reach subdued growth
levels again during the second half. Increased govern-
ment spending and moderate investment growth
allowed small but positive impulses to come from the
domestic economy. The growth contribution of net
exports, on the other hand, turned negative during the
last two quarters. Although Germany managed to
improve its competitiveness (as measured by the rela-
tive unit labour costs in dollar terms) for the fifth year
in a row, exports started falling in the third quarter.
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As an exporter of investment goods Germany was
particularly hard hit by the decline in economic senti-
ment around the world. At the same time imports
remained on an expansion path.
As the final quarter of 2008 was the second consecu-
tive quarter-on-quarter contraction, the United
Kingdom entered recession in the third quarter.
Whereas consumers in the United Kingdom started to
reduce their consumption in the second quarter,
investment had already fallen since January. Ex-
pansionary fiscal policy and improved net exports –
mainly due to a fall in imports – kept GDP from
decreasing until the third quarter. Hence, in contrast
to the situation in Germany, while domestic demand
growth was strongly negative in the United Kingdom,
net exports were positive during the second half of
the year.
Inflation in the United Kingdom surged to a 16-year
high of 4.4 percent in July. While rising energy and
food prices were the main drivers, detailed inflation
data also revealed a broad-based rise in prices of
other goods and services. Wage inflation remained
subdued and UK home prices continued to drop.
Depending on the indicator that is used, the latter
have dropped by close to 20 percent since their peak at
the end of 2007.
Despite a slowdown, domestic demand in France,
continued to increase and was able to compensate for
the negative growth contributions of net exports.
Since the second quarter of last year investment
growth also turned negative leaving private and pub-
lic consumption to keep GDP growth positive. Of the
five largest European economies, France is thereby
the only one which so far has not been in recession as
defined by two consecutive quarters of negative GDP
growth. It is not as dependent on foreign trade in
manufacturing as Germany, is not as heavily involved
in the banking crisis as the United Kingdom and is
not confronted with large corrections on real estate
markets like Spain.
The labour market situation in France remained sta-
ble throughout the year in spite of the menacing
economic crisis. The unemployment rate only
increased slightly.3 It amounted to 7.9 percent in
October, after it stood at a low of 7.7 percent in
January 2008. 
The Italian economy is in recession. GDP fell by an
annualised 0.5 percent in the third quarter after it
already decreased by 0.4 percent in the second quarter
of last year. The Italian recession is broad-based.
Private consumption has been stagnating for quite
some time. Consumer confidence has fallen to a
record-low level. Investment, which already turned
negative in mid-2007, is constrained by more restric-
tive financing conditions as well as weak construction
activities due to restrained house price developments.
For the most part, however, it is the lull in foreign
demand for Italian goods that is putting a burden on
the Italian economy. This, in turn, is caused by strong
competition on world markets (due to the unfavorable
product composition of Italian exports), the continu-
ously deteriorating international competitiveness of
the Italian economy largely due to strongly increasing
unit labour costs, as well as the general economic
decline of the world economy.
GDP in Spain fell by about 0.2 percent in the third
quarter of 2008, after it rose by a similar amount dur-
ing the first half of the year. Private consumption also
dropped in the third quarter. Investments started
falling in the second quarter. The growth contribution
from net exports remained stable – overall exports
rose, while imports fell. As also the fourth quarter is
expected to report negative growth, the economy of
Spain has thus slipped into recession. Especially the
bursting of the real estate bubble is putting a strain on
the expansion of domestic demand. Starting in the
second quarter of 2008, house prices began to decline
after having basically doubled since 2001. This fall in
real estate prices is negatively affecting private con-
sumption due to a lasting increase in the implicit debt
burden of mortgages. This increase has occured, first,
because the value of the provided securities has
dropped. Secondly, due to variable interest rate condi-
tions at which mortgage loans in Spain are normally
granted and the increased risk premium set by banks,
interest costs are likely to increase in the future. The
willingness of Spanish banks to grant credit has
already clearly decreased as a result of the increased
probability of failure.
Although most of the large economies in Europe
entered recession in 2008, most smaller EU member
countries did not report negative growth rates at least
until the fourth quarter of last year. The exceptions
were  Denmark, Estonia, Ireland and  Sweden. In
Denmark, Estonia and Ireland private consumption
went into a slump. For Sweden, negative growth was
mainly caused by a fall in net exports. 
3 However, as discussed in Chapter 4, this incipient increase in unem-
ployment has triggered a pro-active response from the government in
the form of a “jobs package” and further fiscal stimulus.In the East European member countries of the
Europen Union, the economic expansion in the first
half-year slowed down during the rest of 2008. Over
the year, real GDP of these new member countries
that are not part of the euro area increased by about
4.8 percent (see Table A.2). In most countries, and
especially in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovakia, consumption continued to increase sub-
stantially. Investments also expanded robustly in
these countries, whereas they fell in Estonia,
Hungary and Latvia. Overall, the trade balance de-
teriorated somewhat.
3. Fiscal and monetary policy in Europe
3.1 Fiscal policy
Despite the continuing increase in tax receipts, the
public finance situation in general, in both the euro
area as well as the whole EU27, no longer improved
last year. The fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP
increased from 0.6 to 1.3 percent of GDP for the euro
area and from 0.9 to 1.6 percent in the EU27 (see
Table 1.2). In contrast to the United States, the struc-
tural budget deficit in the euro area increased only
slightly last year (see Figure 1.10).
Except for Portugal and Romania, the consolidation
of public finances ceased, and both actual and cycli-
cally-adjusted fiscal balances deteriorated. The coun-
tries that exhibited fiscal surpluses last year are
Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Sweden. Now that Europe is in
recession, fiscal consolidation is no longer at the top
of the agenda. Especially since the autumn, member
states have continuously announced rescue packages,
first of all for the banking sector and more recently
also for the other parts of the economy.
Given the global nature of the crisis, co-ordination is
important and the European Commission acted by
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Box 1.1 
Monetary policy transmission and house prices in Europe
According to theory, a contraction in monetary policy should have a negative effect on house prices. Given that
home ownership determines to a large extent wealth positions of households, this in turn affects consumption 
decisions. The ongoing deregulation of mortgage markets in Europe will in principle increase the importance of this
monetary transmission channel. However, there is no real consensus regarding the relevance of this theoretical
channel in the empirical literature. Given the high degree of heterogeneity in mortgage markets across the European
Union, these effects are bound to differ from one country to the next. Within Europe mortgage credit relative to
GDP ranges between 15 in Italy to 111 percent in the Netherlands; the typical maturity varies between 15 to
30 years and typical loan-to-value ratios between 50 and 112 percent. Furthermore, the degree to which variable
versus fixed interest rates are used varies greatly among countries.
 In a recent study, Carstensen et al. (2008) empirically estimated the impact of monetary policy on house prices on 
a subset of 13 European countries for the period 1995–2006.
1 Besides real house prices and nominal short-term
interest rates as an instrument for monetary policy, the variables included are both real GDP and its deflator.
They find that, in general, nominal house prices increase as a reaction to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
Furthermore, nominal house prices are less sticky than average prices, since house prices adjust to their starting 
level within 5 years, whereas other prices do not. Initially 12 percent and after five years roughly a third of the 
volatility in real house prices can be explained by monetary policy.
Although in general house prices co-move with key macroeconomic variables after a monetary policy shock, the 
study found large heterogeneity amongst countries. For that reason, the authors endogenously divide the data set in
two distinctive groups.
2
 It turns out that monetary policy, both in the long and short run, had stronger effects on house price developments
in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom than in Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy and Portugal. Although the last two years have not been included in their sample, the three
economies currently suffering from unwinding real estate prices – Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom – all
belong to the group that in the past has strongly responded to monetary policy action. As described in the 2007 
EEAG report, at least Ireland and Spain have experienced a prolonged period in which interest rates were well
below optimal levels, from their perspectives. 
1 The sample countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2 There is no general agreement on how to separate countries into groups; usually the separation is based on subjective indicators.
To be as objective as possible Carstensen et al. (2008) cluster countries into distinctive groups taking account of the reaction of
real house prices to a monetary policy shock. The groups of countries – a strong reaction group and a weak reaction group – are
endogenously identified by using a distance measure that is determined by the absolute value of the difference between cumulated 
impulse responses. The impulse responses across the two groups of countries are compared afterwards to assess the macro-
economic effects of movements in real house prices after a change in interest rates.EEAG Report 2009 23
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announcing the so-called European Economic
Recovery Plan at the end of last year. Its immediate
priority is to improve confidence in the financial sys-
tem and subsequently mitigate the impact of the crisis
on the real economy. 
The Recovery Plan consists of two pillars. First on the
list is a scheduled fiscal impulse of 200 billion euros,
which is approximately 1.5 percent of EU GDP. The
major part, 170 billion euros, consists of the national
stimulus programmes which have partly already been
unveiled by member states. The
remaining 30 billion will be
directly funded by the EU. Its
clear focus is on increasing gov-
ernment spending towards areas
which are hit most by the crisis
and from where the largest multi-
plier effects can be expected.
Accordingly, transfers are direct-
ed towards the unemployed and
low-income households, to guar-
antees and loan subsidies, and to
temporarily reduce value-added
taxes. The second pillar focuses
on the continuation of structural
reforms to promote potential
growth and general resilience of






2001–2005 2006  2007  2008 2001–2005 2006  2007  2008 
Germany  63.3  67.6  65.1  64.3   –3.5   –1.5   –0.2  0.0 
France 61.7  63.6  63.9  65.4   –3.0   –2.4   –2.7   –3.0 
Italy  105.7  106.9  104.1  104.1   –3.5   –3.4   –1.6   –2.5 
Spain 49.2  39.6  36.2  37.5  –0.1  2.0  2.2    –1.6 
Netherlands 51.5  47.4  45.7  48.2  –1.5  0.6  0.3  1.2 
Belgium 99.0 87.8  83.9 86.5    –0.5  0.3   –0.3   –0.5 
Austria 65.5  62.0  59.5  57.4   –1.6   –1.5   –0.4   –0.6 
Greece 99.9  95.9  94.8  93.4   –5.5   –2.8   –3.5   –2.5 
Ireland 42.7  39.2  35.1  31.6  3.4  4.1  5.3  5.1 
Finland 31.1  24.7  24.8  31.6  0.8  3.0  0.2    –5.5 
Portugal 57.4  64.7  63.6  64.3   –3.9   –3.9   –2.6   –2.2 
Slovakia 42.1  30.4  29.4  28.8   –4.5   –3.5   –1.9   –2.3 
Slovenia 27.4  26.7  23.4  21.8   –2.6   –1.2  0.5   –0.2 
Luxembourg 6.3  6.6  7.0  14.1  1.5  1.3  3.2  2.7 
Cyprus 66.7  64.6  59.5  48.2   –3.9   –1.2  3.5  1.0 
Malta 66.7  63.9  62.2  63.1   –5.9   –2.3   –1.8   –3.8 
Euro Area 68.9  68.3  66.1  66.6   –2.6   –1.3   –0.6   –1.3 
United Kingdom 39.4  43.4  44.2  50.1   –2.3   –2.7   –2.8   –4.2 
Sweden 52.3  45.9  40.2  34.7  0.5  2.3  3.6  2.6 
Denmark 44.0  30.5  26.2  21.1  –5.3  5.2  4.5  3.1 
Poland  43.9  47.7  44.9  43.7   –5.1   –3.8   –2.0   –2.3 
Czech Republic 28.8  29.6  28.9  26.6   –1.9   –2.7   –1.0   –1.2 
Hungary 21.4  12.4  12.9  13.4   –6.9   –2.2   –2.6   –3.4 
Romania 57.4  65.6  65.8  65.4   –1.8   –9.3   –5.0   –3.4 
Lithuania 20.9  18.0  17.0  17.5  0.6   –0.4   –1.2   –2.7 
Bulgaria 46.8  22.7  18.2  13.8  –1.5  3.0  0.1  3.3 
Latvia 13.9 10.7  9.5 12.3  1.0 –0.2  0.1   –2.3 
Estonia 5.1 4.3  3.5 4.2    –2.0 2.9  2.7    –1.4 
EU27  61.5  61.3  58.7  59.8   –2.5   –1.4   –0.9   –1.6 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product; definitions according to the Maastricht Treaty.
Source: Eurostat and European Commission 
Figure 1.10reforms include reducing administrative burdens for
firms, increasing labour market flexibility, and invest-
ing in infrastructure, human capital and “green”tech-
nologies, all of which have their roots in the Lisbon
Strategy. 
Despite this attempt to coordinate fiscal action with-
in Europe, countries have reacted quite differently to
the economic downturn.
For instance, whereas the German banking sector was
supported swiftly and with large sums of money, for a
long time the central government appeared to be
unwilling to act boldly in the area of fiscal policy.
Thus far, 20 German banks are considering partici-
pating in the 500-billion-euro bank rescue package
put in place by the government in mid-October. 
Initially, the German government announced a stimu-
lus package of about 6 billion euros for 2009 and
2010, which contained a tax rebate when buying a new
car, more favourable depreciation allowances for firms
and tax deductability of bills from craftsmen for
households. More recently, the Bundestag (the lower
house of German parliament) passed a package of
measures, supposedly worth approximately 30 billion
euros, which would be roughly 1.2 percent of German
GDP. 
At the end of November the UK government
announced a package which amounts to 22 billion
euros, i.e., about 1 percent of GDP. Its main ingredi-
ent is a reduction of the value-added tax by 2.5 per-
centage point to 15 percent as of 1 December 2008
until the end of 2009. This alone reduces tax revenue
by 14 billion euros. This temporary cut is indeed like-
ly to boost the domestic retail sector. So far, retail
sales in the United Kingdom have been relatively sta-
ble. However, as the country has been hit particularly
hard by the financial and property crisis, a collapse in
the retail sector should only be a matter of time.
Infrastructure spending is to be increased by 3.3 bil-
lion euros. According to the pre-budget report the
entire package will reduce the effect of the downturn
by 0.5 percentage points.
France has unveiled a 26 billion euro stimulus pack-
age, which is equivalent to about 1.3 percent of GDP.
Besides massive subsidies for medium-sized business-
es, the plan earmarks 10.5 billion euros for infrastruc-
ture and R&D expenditure research, and the support
of local authorities. The French economics minister
said the plan should create 80,000 to 110,000 new
jobs, making up for the expected disappearance of
some 90,000 jobs next year due to the crisis.
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said that Italy will
take measures that amount up to 80 billion euros to
support the Italian economy. This would be about
5 percent of GDP. However, many economists have
already pointed out that the vast majority of this
money is no more than a recycling of existing
funds. The measures include a temporary freeze on
regulated energy prices and road tolls, 2.4 billion
euros in tax breaks for poorer families and some
marginal easing of the direct and indirect tax bur-
den for companies.
During the second half of last year, Spain announced
various measures to cushion the impact of the eco-
nomic slowdown and soaring unemployment. Most
recently, the government said it will spend an extra
11 billion euros on public works and other stimulus
measures to create 300,000 jobs in 2009. The package
includes 6 billion euros in tax cuts and 4 billion euros
of liquidity to credit-strapped companies and house-
holds. The plan, equivalent to roughly 1 percent of
Spanish GDP, furthermore includes 800 million euros
in aid for the auto sector.
Other countries within the European Union have also
announced programs of similar orders of magnitude.
For instance, in the Netherlands, the government com-
municated a so-called “liquidity impulse” of 6 billion
euros, which equals roughly 1 percent of GDP. It
includes allowing companies to write down invest-
ments sooner than usual.
3.2 Monetary conditions and financial markets
The financial crisis
In summer 2007, the financial crisis was triggered by
announcements that some banks around the world
were in financial distress due to losses on investments
in US mortgage-backed securities. Overly optimistic
expectations about future growth and interest rates in
combination with various subsidies and other policy
interventions led to unsustainably high house prices in
the United States. Ex post, it is obvious that a correc-
tion of this bubble, as it is often labelled in the public
debate, had to occur. Its bursting has led to a sharp re-
evaluation of associated mortgage-backed securities.
Strong interlinkages between balance sheets of finan-
cial institutions have consequently triggered a severe
loss in mutual confidence within the banking sector.
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This in turn caused the need for further write-downs
and losses, and a downward spiral set in. 
In early 2008, the reduction in money market interest
rate spreads, which with hindsight was only tempo-
rary, appeared to signal that perhaps the worst was
over (see Figure 1.11). However, what started with the
loan defaults in the US subprime sector affected a
steadily widening variety of financial markets over the
course of the past year. As it turned out, the subprime
mortgage crisis did not actually reach a critical stage
until September 2008. Then, liquidity contracted
severely in the global credit markets, and several
investment banks and insurers in the United States
threatened to turn insolvent. The spread between the
three-month interbank rates and the policy rates
reached unprecendented levels in the United States
and Europe. Whereas the spread peaked with an aver-
age of 306 basis points in the United States in
November, it was still 115 basis points in the euro area
that same month. In response, the US government
announced a series of comprehensive steps to address
the problems, following a series of stand-alone deci-
sions whether to intervene or not. For instance, a liq-
uidity facility for American International Group
(AIG) was created on September 16. Furthermore,
the Federal Reserve basically took over Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac – the government sponsored enter-
prises that are behind a vast majority of new mort-
gage lending in the United States. However, it did not
intervene to prevent the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, which nowadays is considered to have trig-
gered an unprecendented wave of mistrust and there-
by an almost complete drain off on interbank mar-
kets. This near-collapse of world-wide financial sys-
tems was only prevented by decisive actions of central
banks around the world – they basically turned into
the main provider of liquidity on interbank markets.
Chapter 2 of this year’s EEAG report is devoted
entirely to the financial crisis. Here we highlight its
most importance consequences
for economic developments.
Most importantly, the loss in
confidence amongst bankers has
widened to a general drop in sen-
timent. Households started to
fear a loss in their financial sav-
ings, and firms projected the situ-
ation of the financial markets
onto the real economy. Prospects
deteriorated more sharply than
otherwise would have been the
case, causing a withdrawal of
investment plans (including residential investments)
and a cut-back in the consumption of durable goods
(such as cars). 
The other channel through which the banking crisis
affects household and firm decisions is via the will-
ingness of banks to supply credit. As already argued
in last year’s EEAG report, it is in general difficult to
come up with statistical evidence that clearly refutes
or proves the existence of a credit crunch scenario.4 To
do so, we would need to know the excess-demand for
or the under-supply of credits instead of the actual
quantity and price, i.e., interest rate. A credit crunch
does not necessarily show up in higher risk premia
enclosed in market interest rates – balance sheet prob-
lems on the side of the bank might simply lead them
to become more selective without an increase in the
price. Nor is a fall in credit volumes necessarily a
result of the reduced credit supply – it might simply be
demand which is falling. It would, however, be diffi-
cult to associate a credit crunch with increasing cred-
it volumes.
After a short pause during the winter last year, inter-
est rates for new loans to households and firms in the
euro area continued to increase slowly until the sum-
mer. This process, which started in early 2006, seems
to have come to a halt in more recent months. This
pattern is most pronounced for loans with maturities
of more than five years – constituting more than half
of the total credit volume. With respect to credit vol-
umes, the patterns have been clear since early last year
(see Figure 1.12). Although credit to non-financial
corporations remains, growing at reduced levels,
annual growth rates fell from 15 percent in the first
Figure 1.11
4 A situation in which banks constrain their credit supply to still
profitable projects is usually labelled a credit crunch. This would in
general be caused by balance sheet problems on the part of the bank.
This does not include situations in which banks constrain the credit
supply because formerly profitable investment projects are no longer
considered profitable, for instance, due to a changing economic envi-
ronment.quarter of 2008 to 12.2 percent in the third. Especially
the last few months have seen sharp falls in growth
rates. The decline in growth of both consumer credits
and mortgages – which started already in 2006 – con-
tinued throughout the year. Annual growth rates
decreased to approximately 4 percent at the end of the
third quarter of last year. 
At least up until autumn, financial turbulence did not
seem to have a great impact on credit data. Potential
explanations might be that corporations made use of
pre-committed credit lines and did not reduce their
demand for bank credit as much because direct access
to financial markets was even more restrained. More
recently, however, the impact of the financial crisis
has started to show up more clearly in credit data.
This situation is likely to continue to worsen as espe-
cially survey data has pointed out. For Europe, we can
fall back on the results of busi-
ness tendency surveys, which ask
firms about their financial con-
straints, and on the bank lending
survey conducted by the ECB
among the private banks within
the euro area.
In the business tendency surveys
published by the European Com-
mission, firms in manufacturing,
the services and construction are
asked on a quarterly basis
whether financial constraints are
limiting their production capabil-
ities. Figure 1.13 shows that
indeed within the services sector
the percentage of firms indicat-
ing they are financially con-
strained has increased to close to
16 percent in the last quarter. In
manufacturing and construction,
we also see an increase – albeit
less pronounced. 
In particular, the bank lending
survey of the ECB indicates that
banks have already tightened
their lending conditions substan-
tially and plan to continue to do
so in the coming months. The net
percentage of banks expecting a
tightening of credit standards in
the first quarter of this year
increased to 66 percent. This fig-
ure stood at only 3 percent five
quarters earlier. However, the most important reason
mentioned by the banks for this tightening in credit
standards is the expected deterioration of future eco-
nomic activity. 
Although more and more evidence is pointing
towards a further lowering of credit growth in the
near future, it is still too early to tell whether this is
due to the balance sheet problems of banks, and
thereby the start of a real credit crunch in the euro
area, or due to the deterioration of the economic cli-
mate and thereby increased default risks of invest-
ment projects.
Monetary conditions in Europe
After an additional tightening at the beginning of last
year due to a further appreciation of the euro, mone-
EEAG Report 2009 26
Chapter 1
Figure 1.12
Figure 1.13EEAG Report 2009 27
Chapter 1
tary conditions remained tight
until summer last year (see
Figure 1.14). In early July, the
ECB even increased its main refi-
nancing rate by 25 basis points to
a level of 4.25 percent (see Figure
1.15). Especially the interest rate
cuts of the ECB starting from
early October have loosened
monetary conditions in the euro
area. During the autumn,
though, problems in the Euro-
pean interbank market kept
money market interest rates well
above the main refinancing rate.
The reduction in the money mar-
ket spreads loosened monetary
conditions at an even faster pace
at the end of last year. Never-
theless, the still strong euro pre-
vents our monetary conditions
indicator from falling below its
long-run average. 
Mirroring the developments on
the credit market, the annual
growth rate of money supply, as
measured by M3, fell throughout
the year (see Figure 1.16). At the
end of 2007 it stood at about
12 percent; this has now fallen to
close to 8 percent. Last year was
thereby the eighth year in a row
in which M3 growth exceeded the
ECB reference value of 4.5 per-
cent. The banking crisis, however,
becomes evident when we look at
the more narrowly defined mea-
sures of money. For instance, M1
has basically stagnated since last
summer after having had a stable
growth rate of around 6 percent
throughout 2007.
Reduced growth forecasts caused
the Bank of England to cut its
bank rate from 5.75 percent to
5 percent in three steps during
winter 2007/2008. After keeping it
fixed until early October, the out-
break of the economic crisis
induced a sharp fall of 350 basis
points to a historically low level of
1.5 percent in January this year. 
Figure 1.14
Figure 1.15
Figure 1.16Bonds, stocks and foreign
exchange markets
During the first half of 2008,
government bond yields in euro
area member states first in-
creased by about 80 basis points
and then subsequently fell by
130 basis points until the end of
the year (see Figure 1.17).
Whereas at the beginning of the
year there were indications that
problems on financial markets
would stabilize, an increased
surge towards safe assets not
only led to the fall in govern-
ment bond yields but also
caused corporate bond yields to
rise. This increased risk aversion
is reflected in the rise in the
interest differential between cor-
porate and government bonds
(see Figure 1.18). These spreads
have now reached unprecedent-
ed levels. 
Although volatile, stock markets
stagnated during the first half of
2008 (see Figure 1.19). The
volatility increased further dur-
ing the second half of the year
and stock indexes plummeted
everywhere around the world.
Since its peak, the Euro STOXX
50 fell by about 45 percent; the
US, UK and Japanese stock
indexes faced similar declines.
Overall, stock markets have now
almost reached the lows reported
in early 2003. The sharp interest
rate cuts around the world were
not able to prevent this.
Not only are stock markets in
turmoil, also exchange rates have
been fluctuating heavily since the
start of the financial crisis. Until
July 2008, the US dollar contin-
ued to drop steeply against the
euro and reached its all time
monthly low at a 1.58. Sub-
sequently, it bounced back to
1.34 in December (after the low
in November). In real effective
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terms, the euro is now back at average levels of
2004–2006 (see Figure 1.20). 
Unlike in Sweden and the United Kingdom, the cen-
tral bank in Denmark is focusing on keeping its
exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro stable. The turmoil on
financial markets and the thereby induced flight
towards quality, which is also associated with country
size, has put pressure on currencies of smaller
economies. The central bank of Denmark was there-
fore forced to raise interest rates on two separate occa-
sions in October, thereby widening the spread
between Danish and euro area rates. The increases
were partially reversed in early November, following a
cut in euro area rates. Partly triggered by these prob-
lems, the Danish government has again raised the pos-
sibility of holding a referendum on whether to join
the euro area. 
To keep the currency board
arrangements in Estonia and
Lithuania and the pegged ex-
change rate regime in Latvia alive
while at the same time not having
a complete withdrawal of foreign
capital, money market interest
rates have increased sharply in
these countries during the past
months. This is now putting a
large burden on their domestic
economies. The other new EU
member states have seen clear
depreciation of their local cur-
rencies. To stop this process, the
central banks in many of these
countries have also increased
interest rates.
4. The economic outlook for
2009 and 2010
4.1 The global economy
Most regions of the world econo-
my are in recession. The expecta-
tions of the participants of the
Ifo World Economic Survey indi-
cate that this winter, growth is
expected to fall further. Although
expectations in North America
seem to have reached a trough
during last winter, the outlook
for Asia has never been as bleak since the start of the
survey in 1990 (see Figure 1.21).
Whereas the Ifo World Economic Survey asks partic-
ipants for their expectations for the upcoming
6 months, the survey of Consensus Economics
amongst professional forecasters covers the entire
year 2009. Figure 1.22 converts these monthly survey
results into expectations for the upcoming 12 months.
The initially expected moderate slowdown turned into
a sharp fall in growth forecasts around the world in
autumn last year. Many forecast institutes still appear
to be in the process of adjusting their estimates down-
ward.
The uncertainty concerning future business cycle
developments has stayed at a historically high level.
Figure 1.20
Figure 1.21The underlying problems that have triggered the cur-
rent world economic downswing remain virulent. The
fall in US real estate prices continues and has even
picked up speed again in recent months, and the situ-
ation on international financial markets remains crit-
ical. However, as compared to last year, it has become
clear that it will not be possible to keep the problems
isolated to the US real estate and international finan-
cial markets. Mainly via sharply falling sentiment
around the world, the real economy has also fallen
into a slump. 
Currently, all economic indicators – regardless of
which region or sector they refer to – point in the
same downward direction. Moreover, the speed of the
downturn as well as the levels already reached are
truly unique. Most worrisome is
that still no bottom seems to have
formed.
In the current situation, which is
characterised by a high degree
of pessimism, it is difficult to
identify factors that could, in
the short run, brake the reces-
sion. A glimmer of hope stems
from the stimulus packages ini-
tiated by many governments
around the world. However, the
continuously changing situation
on this front and the general
uncertainty felt by economic
agents makes it difficult to esti-
mate the magnitude of these
programs and their effects.
Another positive aspect is the
drop in the inflation rate, which
above all is driven by the marked
drop of the prices for food and
raw materials. This should
strengthen the purchasing
power of consumers. Finally, it
is still possible that the current
mood is an exaggeration of the
actual and future situation, in
which case it could turn swiftly.
The discrepancy between expec-
tations and the appraisal of the
present, actual situation is still
exceptionally large in many
countries.
Nevertheless, we expect world
economic growth to stay well
below potential during our forecasting horizon. For
2009, we expect the weighted average growth rate in
our sample of 49 countries when using GDP at mar-
ket prices as weights to be a mere 0.3 percent (see
Table A.1). Considering an annual world population
growth rate of 1.2 percent, world per capita GDP
growth will even turn negative this year. Over the
last 40 years, this only occurred twice (in the reces-
sion years 1982 and 1991). Measured by this, the
recession is deep but not exceptional in the post-war
period.
From a welfare perspective, it makes sense to correct
these figures for the lower price levels in China and
other emerging economies. Using such purchasing-
power-parity adjusted data increases the annual
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growth rate for the world economy to 1.4 percent in
2009 (see Figure 1.1). 
The deteriorated firm expectations, the global bank-
ing crisis, the real estate problems in some countries
and the general decline in wealth positions around the
world have all put downward pressure on real eco-
nomic activity. Given the severity of the crises, a quick
turnaround does not appear likely. 
Albeit much less than in the previous years, Asia,
Latin America and Russia still continue to add posi-
tive contributions to world economic growth this year.
These barely manage to compensate for the sharp
negative growth contributions coming from both
North America (in particular the United States) and
Western Europe (see Figure 1.23). Looking at the
three major industrialised regions in the world in iso-
lation, Figure 1.24 highlights that they have become –
and will stay – almost synchronised during this and
the next year.
4.2 United States
The recession in the United States will continue
throughout the year. Only at the end of 2010 is a
slow recovery expected. This downturn will be so
persistent mainly because US consumers have been
living beyond their means for too long. To allow for
a way back to a sustainable growth path, this behav-
iour must now be corrected. 
As described in previous EEAG reports, low interest
rates, too loose credit allocation policies of banks as
well as associated increases in house prices resulted in
consumption growth that ex-
ceeded income growth in past
years. The bursting of the real
estate bubble since mid-2007 has
made it clear that this cannot be
sustained. Real estate prices have
been falling ever since and a land-
ing is not to be expected soon.
Futures contracts imply that
market participants expect house
prices to decline by another
15 percent before reaching a
trough in the course of 2010. 
The situation has been worsened
by the subsequent crisis on the
international financial markets
that caused large depreciations
and write-downs in bank balances. Although govern-
ment intervention has prevented a collapse of the
banking system, it could not circumvent a general fall
in financial asset prices and to contamination of other
sectors of the economy. Because of falling capital
ratios and to insure adequate risk provisions, banks
are increasingly reducing their willingness to supply
credit to both households and firms.
The negative wealth effects and increased credit con-
straints together with the deteriorating labour market
conditions will all put a heavy burden on private con-
sumption in the years to come. Adaptation delays will
force consumption growth to stay negative or at least
below potential for a longer period of time. This will
dampen import demand and thereby reduce the new
indebtedness to the rest of the world. This adjustment
process will not be completed quickly and will hence
hinder the recovery of the world economy for quite
some time. Nevertheless, the fall in consumption will
not continue at the same pace that we have seen in the
last two quarters. Both falling inflation rates and the
business cycle programmes initiated by the new US
administration will stimulate consumption demand to
some degree. 
Investment will decline. Forward-looking indicators
for the real estate market in the United States, like
building permits, still point towards a further slow-
down. Consequently, residential investment will con-
tinue to put a burden on economic growth. Further-
more, firms face deteriorating sales and profit per-
spectives, and more restrictive credit conditions. The
latter will hit particularly small- and medium-sized
firms, which usually finance themselves through bank
credits. This will restrain equipment and software
Figure 1.24investment. Investment in non-residential structures,
which has so far been an important pillar for growth
in the United States, will tend to weaken as well. It
will not be before mid-2010 that investment demand
will pick up again and contribute to economic growth
in the United States. By then, investment in equip-
ment and software will reach its cyclical trough, and
house prices are expected to bottom out.
From a demand side perspective, only net exports will
be able to contribute positively to economic growth.
Although export growth will slow down considerably
due to the economic malaise in many of the trading
partners of the United States, the fall in domestic
demand will keep import growth lower. After five
quarters of negative growth, the latter will neverthe-
less slowly turn positive again. 
Overall, this will result in a contraction of the US
economy of 1 percent in 2009 and stagnation in 2010
(see Table A.1). The deterioration of labour market
conditions will continue. The unemployment rate will
increase on average to 7.5 percent both this and next
year.
The recession and the fall in energy prices will cause
inflation to reduce further to 0.3 percent this year. In
2010, consumer prices will grow by 1.3 percent on
average. Although inflation rates might turn negative
for some months, medium- to long-run inflation
expectations appear to be well anchored at a level of
2.5 percent for the United States. Furthermore, core
inflation rates appear to be relatively stable as well.
We therefore do not expect deflation problems to
occur within our forecasting horizon.
4.3 Japan, China, India and other Asian countries
Economic expectations remain bleak in Japan.
Business expectations have deteriorated sharply due
to the somber outlook for the world economy and
consumer confidence also continues to fall, reaching
its lowest level in 26 years in November. Although it is
not yet clear how strongly the financial crisis will
affect the Japanese economy, banks have started to
become more risk averse and credit conditions show
signs of worsening. Furthermore, the slowdown of
world economic growth has reduced the willingness of
the large export-oriented firms in Japan to invest.
Accordingly, investment will continue to slump. 
Due to the fall in raw material prices, inflation rates
will temporarily turn negative in the middle of this
year leading to an overall fall of prices by 0.2 percent
in 2009. However, it is not likely that this will turn into
a persistent and broadly based decline in prices as
Japan experienced in the 1990s. In contrast, the lower
prices might actually support the purchasing power of
households and thereby prevent a stronger fall in con-
sumption. Nevertheless, the somewhat deteriorating
labour market conditions together with fading con-
sumer confidence will lead to a weakening of private
consumption. 
Overall, the recession in Japan will continue.
Domestic demand will hardly expand over the next
two years. Given the weak economic conditions of
Japan’s major trading partners, it can no longer be
expected that foreign trade will deliver any growth
impulses. GDP will decline by 0.8 percent this year
to subsequently grow by a moderate 0.4 percent in
2010.
This recession will not be as severe as the one in the
mid-1990s or those in the United States and Europe.
Although stagnating demand from China will not
bring any growth impulses, Japan’s high export share
to China will at same time assure some degree of sta-
bilisation. Furthermore, as compared to the 1990s,
firms have hardly accumulated debt. Hence they have
much higher capital ratios and have not built up
excess capacities. On top of that, credit conditions are
much more favourable in Japan than in the United
States or Europe, and signs of a real estate bubble
have been very limited so far. 
Because of the economic crisis it has become more
and more difficult for the Japanese government to
achieve its aim of achieving a primary budget surplus
in the fiscal year 2011. Presently government debt is
still substantial. At the same time the government
approved several economic programmes last year.
Credit guarantees are scheduled for small- and medi-
um-sized enterprises, the transport industry is to be
supported, public building projects will be financed,
tax rebates for households are scheduled, new mort-
gages are to be subsidised and capital injections for
regional banks are planned. The deficit ratio will
clearly rise above 3 percent during the current and the
upcoming year.
As all of the major developed economies are in reces-
sion (especially the United States), export- and invest-
ment-driven expansion in China (incl.  Hong Kong)
will be affected more strongly in 2009 and 2010. At
the same time, inflation will slow down further. This
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will allow the Chinese central bank to continue to
reduce its key interest rate and the minimum reserve
requirements of banks. 
To support domestic demand, which is also fading,
the central government has announced an economic
stimulus package of 4 trillion yuan (450 billion euros)
to be spent in 2009 and 2010. The funds are intended
to finance programs in 10 major areas, such as low-
income housing, rural infrastructure, water, electric-
ity, transportation, the environment, technological
innovation and rebuilding after disasters like the
earthquake of 12 May 2008. The policies include a
comprehensive reform in value-added taxes, which
would cut industry costs by 120 billion yuan.
Commercial banks’ credit ceilings will be abolished
to channel more lending to priority projects, rural
areas, smaller enterprises, technical innovation and
industrial rationalisation through mergers and acqui-
sitions. Provincial governments have drawn up plans
that will bring total spending to 10 trillion yuan
(1.1 trillion euros), more than twice the original pro-
gramme announced by the central government on
9 November. This amounts to about 16 percent of
nominal GDP.
These extensive measures will, however, not be able to
offset the reduced demand from abroad. Further-
more, weak labour market and wage developments
will put a burden on private consumption and will
therefore counter the positive impulses that come
from the fiscal stimulus and lower inflation. GDP
growth is expected to fall to 7.5 percent this and the
next year (after 9.4 percent last year).
Despite the slowdown in export growth, it is not like-
ly that China’s current account surplus will start
shrinking any time soon. A weakening of the domes-
tic economy but especially falling raw material prices
will cause (nominal) import growth to be reduced by
at least the same rate.
As compared to other emerging economies, India’s
growth is based much more on its own savings. Its sav-
ings rate has gone up from about 25 percent since the
first years of this century to more than 35 percent
today. For that reason, India could turn out to be rel-
atively insulated from global financial problems.
Nevertheless, India has also become more and more
integrated with the global economy. Exports plus
imports are now 45 percent of GDP, so the global
recession will certainly affect India as well although to
a lesser extent than most other emerging market
economies, which are generally much more dependent
upon international trade. 
The upcoming general election scheduled for this
spring has already created a relatively loose fiscal
policy stance. It thereby will become difficult for the
government to respond to the impact of the global
financial crisis with supplementary fiscal measures.
On the other hand, the global financial crisis has
already triggered a complete reversal of monetary
policy, which we expect to be followed by further
interest rate cuts this year. Despite the reversal of the
commodity price boom, India will – because of its
loosened fiscal policy stance – remain highly vulner-
able to upward inflationary pressures in 2009. GDP
growth will decline overall to 6 percent this year and
6.2 percent in 2010. 
In the remaining emerging economies of Asia, i.e.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, GDP growth will also
slow down further. Although domestic demand will
continue to grow in most economies for some time (as
labour markets will remain tight for the coming
months), the world economic situation will negatively
affect their trading sectors. Countries like the
Philippines, which have specialised in the production
of electronic goods, will suffer the most. Con-
sequently, the high current account surplus of the
region will be substantially reduced this year. GDP of
these East Asian countries will grow by only 3 percent
this and 3.2 percent the upcoming year.
4.4 The rest of the world
The present cooling of the global economic climate
not only affects the larger economic regions of North
America, Western Europe and Asia, but also Central
and Eastern Europe, Russia and Latin America. 
We anticipate that central banks in the Latin
American region, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico and  Venezuela, will relax their
monetary policy stance as both inflation pressure
and growth prospects are subdued. Furthermore,
against this external backdrop many governments
will curb public investment and engage in counter-
cyclical policies. Prudent macroeconomic policies in
the past will allow for this. Declining raw material
prices, collapsing external demand and exchange rate
depreciations will deteriorate current accounts of
those Latin American economies that have based
their recent upswing largely on commodity exports.Overall the region will see a marked decline of
growth from 4.2 percent last year to 3.1 and 3.3 per-
cent this and the upcoming year.
Real GDP growth in Russia is expected to slow to an
average of 2 percent this year and 3.5 percent in 2010.
This reflects the impact of financial turmoil, lower
commodity prices and weak energy sector production.
Furthermore, domestic demand growth will also
weaken. The impact of much lower oil prices on
exports will outweigh this and the current-account
surplus will be sharply reduced in the next two years.
Almost entirely based on oil revenues, Russia has
increased government spending excessively in the past
few years. Despite lower oil prices and thereby more
binding fiscal constraints, fiscal policy is bound to
stay expansionary. After a fiscal tightening during the
past few quarters, the government at the end of last
year announced a package of measures to support the
real economy amid the financial turmoil. The package
includes cuts in corporate and other taxes, faster
amortisation schedules and support for small busi-
ness. The possibility of a further steep devaluation of
the rouble and an increase in insolvencies of firms
that have built up too many short-term foreign credits
present the main risks to macroeconomic stability in
Russia.
4.5 Assumptions, risks and uncertainties
When forecasting the economic development for the
world economy, we have assumed that credit growth
will clearly slow down as a result of the economic
downturn and the associated deterioration of credit
risks. More accommodativing monetary policy will
cause lending rates to continue to fall, although with
considerable delays. The risk premiums on corporate
bonds, which have strongly increased, will stay at high
levels and aggravate financing via capital markets.In
addition, no further negative shocks are assumed, and
the oil price is expected to fluctuate in a range
between 40 and 50 US dollars throughout the estima-
tion period.
The likelihood of a broadly-based credit crunch has
increased. It is still possible that other financial assets
like credit card claims or credit default swaps will
undergo write-downs. If associated with a further
deterioration of trust amongst banks and, as a conse-
quence, additional corrections in their balance sheets,
this could well lead to a severe cut in credit lines
around the world.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the mone-
tary conditions will turn out to be less restrictive and
that banks will be able to cut lending rates more
quickly and by more than expected. The interest rate
cuts by central banks around the world have been
swift and substantial. Also, the newly created instru-
ments by central banks and in particular the Federal
Reserve, which have enabled a de facto unlimited
provision of central bank money, could slowly show
their impact and stimulate economic activity more
than expected. Furthermore, the government guar-
antees on deposits could help defuse the liquidity
problems faced by banks during our forecasting
horizon. If mistrust amongst banks were successful-
ly reduced, high risk premia on the interbank market
would fall. That would reduce refinancing costs and
end the costly behaviour of private banks to hoard
central bank money.
The persistently high current account deficit makes
the economic forecast for the United States espe-
cially risky. If foreign investors raise their risk
assessments with regard to the US capital market,
this could lead to a general withdrawal of foreign
capital and a fall in the US dollar. Consequently,
interest rates would mount and both private con-
sumption and business investment would suffer even
more. 
4.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
The credit crisis has turned into a recession in large
parts of the world; consumer and producer confi-
dence have crumbled, and the euro is still relatively
strong. Accordingly, most member countries are or
will soon be in recession. This means that, unlike in
the past, national demand shortfalls will not be off-
set by growth in other countries, and growth in final
domestic demand in the European Union will reach
an all-time low. Against this backdrop, the situation
is unlikely to stabilise soon. Whereas the European
Union managed to grow by 1.1 percent last year, we
expect GDP to shrink by 1.2 percent this year. Only
in 2010 will economic growth turn positive again
and reach a subdued level of 0.5 percent (see
Figure 1.26).
Of the demand components, only private and pub-
lic consumption will be able to contribute positive-
ly to economic growth this year (see Figure 1.27).
Reduced inflation rates will support developments
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in real disposable income. Nevertheless, the gener-
ally increased job uncertainty will keep consump-
tion growth at moderate levels over our forecasting
horizon. Those countries suffering a real estate cri-
sis will face substantially lower consumption
growth. Not only do real estate prices affect the
profitability of building houses and thus residential
investment, they are also an important determinant
of household wealth and hence of private con-
sumption.
Investment will put a major burden on growth in
Europe this year. A combination of falling profits,
tougher financing conditions and lower growth
prospects has sharply reduced the willingness of
firms to invest. However, when banking normalises
and cuts in central bank interest
rates start to reach the firm
level, the tide might start to turn
in the second half of this year,
notably for equipment invest-
ment. Corrections in housing
markets normally take more
time, and thus it will not be until
2010 before residential invest-
ment begins to normalise. We
expect a moderate growth con-
tribution from investment
demand in 2010. 
Much weaker demand from the
rest of the world will lead to a
slowdown of export growth. As
import growth will not fade to
the same extent, the growth con-
Box 1.2 
Deflation in Europe?
After having suffered from high inflation rates during the first half of 2008, we have observed a strong decline in
inflation rates thereafter. With the slowdown in economic activity, a number of analysts now fear deflation.
Deflation is a substantial threat for modern economies; it directly reallocates wealth from borrowers to lenders. It
therefore appears to be especially worrisome for economies that carry a high burden of debt, like the United States.
The more severe and indirect consequence is that if prices fall, people tend to postpone consumption, which reduces 
demand for goods and services and leads to a further fall in prices. A vicious cycle begins, which makes it even
more worrisome as there is no easy way out. How pressing is the issue today?
To assess this we first decompose past inflation rates into its energy component and what is usually labelled “core
inflation”, i.e., the inflation rate excluding price developments of energy and unprocessed food. While the 
aggregate inflation rate also moved up, core inflation has remained quite stable. Hence, price increases in the euro
area were mainly due to the rise in energy prices. Energy prices have been rising sharply since the autumn of 2007
and falling since the summer of 2008. Already a stabilisation of energy prices will – via the so-called base effect – 
result in a correction of inflation levels one year later. Hence, due to the sharp oil price increases a year ago, we
now see inflation rates falling; assuming the oil price stabilises, the fall in oil prices last autumn will lead to rising
inflation rates this autumn.  
To turn negative inflation rates into a fall in domestic spending, i.e. into what is usually meant with a real
deflation scenario, inflation expectations need to be negative as well; spending is delayed if households and firm
expect prices to fall in the future. Figure 1.25 shows the inflation expectations for the euro area at 12 and 24 month 
horizons as reported by the ECB survey of professional forecasters. Although both one and two year ahead 
forecasts are presently falling somewhat, they are coming from high levels and are still far from becoming negative.
In fact, expectations appear to be remarkably anchored around a value of 2 percent, i.e. the target inflation rate of 
the ECB. Data from other sources, like Consensus Economics or the EU Consumer Survey, show rather similar 
developments, i.e. also point downwards in recent time but are not anywhere near historically low levels.
   To sum up, given the current stance of the economy it is certainly more adequate to state that we are currently in a 
period of disinflation rather than at the gates of deflation. Core inflation has remained relatively and remarkably
stable over the last one and half years and has hardly been affected by the current fall in energy prices. Considering
survey data on inflation expectations, we observe some moderation but clearly not too worrisomely low or negative 
levels. 
Figure 1.25tribution from net exports will
clearly turn negative this year. 
Employment, sectoral output and
inflation
Weak business cycle develop-
ments will lead to a fall in
employment both this and next
year (see Figure 1.28). After
reaching a peak in the first half
of 2008, the output gap in the
European Union has now been
closed. It will continue to widen
throughout most of our fore-
casting horizon. As a conse-
quence the unemployment rate
will rise to 8.1 percent in 2009
and 8.6 percent next year (see
Figure 1.29). 
A number of factors need to be
considered when estimating the
potential risk of crises affecting
individual sectors. First of all, it
seems expedient to distinguish
between sectors that focus on
the domestic market and those
that are export-oriented. In the
case of companies that generate
the majority of their sales
abroad, it is important to distin-
guish between individual mar-
kets. While demand in the Unit-
ed States, the United Kingdom
and Spain has indeed fallen
sharply, economies in most
emerging markets are continu-
ing to develop, albeit at a more
moderate pace. Although the
outlook for almost all European
companies is likely to worsen,
consumer-focused sectors are
likely to be less seriously affect-
ed. This is because they tend to
benefit from the still-favourable
– albeit deteriorating – state of
the labour market and the
growth in real incomes enjoyed
by private households. The lat-
ter is a direct result of the con-
tinuing decline in the rate of
inflation this year. The increase
in consumer prices will be
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1.6 percent in 2009. In 2010, we will see some nor-
malisation towards a level of 1.8 percent.
Furthermore, factors such as the share of com-
modities in production (whose global market
prices, denominated in dollars, have mostly seen
sharp declines of late) as well as wage levels (a num-
ber of recent wage settlements were concluded
when the outlook for certain sectors appeared
upbeat) also have a role to play in the performance
of the individual sector.
Differences in output growth within Europe
Given the weakness of the world economy, the eco-
nomic development of single countries will largely
depend upon domestic demand. On both fronts,
Germany is expected to be hit relatively hard (see
Figure 1.30). Large parts of the economy are very
much dependent upon interna-
tional trade. The share of manu-
facturing involved in producing
investment goods is relatively
high. It is therefore no surprise
that the growth contribution of
net exports reached an average of
1.1 percentage points during the
previous upswing period
2004–2007. As a comparision, it
only amounted to 0.1 percentage
point for the euro area as a
whole. At the same time, private
consumption in Germany has
been weak for years now and a
strong turnaround is not expect-
ed any time soon. Furthermore,
the German government has
been relatively reluctant to stimulate domestic
demand. Taken all together, this will keep annual real
GDP growth negative throughout our forecasting
horizon.
In the United Kingdom, the wide fallout from the
financial crisis, falling house prices, sharply rising
unemployment and weak foreign demand will all con-
tribute to real GDP contraction in 2009. Weaker price
pressure, lower interest rates, a more competitive cur-
rency, and a gradual improvement in external demand
should support some recovery in activity from 2010,
but the pace of growth will be sluggish, reflecting the
huge scale of balance-sheet adjustment taking place
in the private sector.
Albeit less pronounced, also France will go through a
recessionary phase. The increase in private consump-
tion will only be moderate.
Mainly falling investments will
turn GDP growth negative in
2009. Due to the economic situa-
tion in which major trading part-
ners find themselves, net exports
will hardly improve. Inflation
will notably fall and the unem-
ployment rate will increase this
year. 
For the second year in a row,
GDP growth in Italy will be neg-
ative this year. Besides the world
economic downturn, it is the lack
of competitiveness of the Italian
economy which has turned this
into a rather deep recession.
Figure 1.28
Figure 1.29Since 1996, its export performance has been worsen-
ing – a process which does not appear to be ending
any time soon.
As in the United Kingdom, the real estate sector is
placing a drag on the Spanish economy. However,
whereas house prices have already tumbled quite a bit
in the United Kingdom, it appears that in Spain the
real drop has still to occur. Negative consumption and
investment growth will lead to a negative GDP growth
rate of – 1.6 percent this year. 
Most of the smaller economies in Europe are heavily
dependent on external demand simply due to their
size. As a consequence, economic
growth will fall in each of these
countries as well. 
At the start of this year, Slovakia
joined the euro area. Although
economically not very important
for European developments, with
a population close to 5.5 million
and a share of 1.3 percent in the
euro area’s GDP, it is nevertheless
the biggest East European mem-
ber state after Poland. With the
help of large foreign investments,
Slovakia in recent years has
turned into a modern market
economy. All major sectors have
been privatised; and, for instance,
the banking sector is now almost
completely in foreign hands.
Sound fiscal and business friend-
ly policies – like a 19 percent flat
tax rate – have allowed growth to
be high in recent years. The main
advantages of the euro adoption
for Slovakia will be the reduced
currency risk for exporters and a
more stable environment for for-
eign direct investment. Never-
theless, there is a danger that now
that the euro has been adopted,
the present government will turn
to more state-interventionist poli-
cies, which will reduce its attrac-
tiveness for foreign investors.
Although it will clearly level off
as well, economic growth in most
new EU member states will
remain positive. Real GDP of the
region will increase by only 1.6 percent in the current
year and 2.9 percent next year. Mainly domestic
demand will keep growth from turning negative.
Inflation will level off and the unemployment rates
will increase.
The new member states that face negative annual
growth during our forecast horizon are Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania. The three Baltic states
were in the group of front-runners when it comes to
economic growth in past years. However, the financial
turmoil has turned their large current account deficits
into serious problems. Domestic demand will keep
growth rates positive albeit lower in Bulgaria, the
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Whereas the previous upswing reduced fiscal deficits
and debt positions throughout Europe in the years
before, the tide clearly changed last year. A large part
of the previous consolidation was simply due to extra-
ordinary economic growth. Although it should have
been clear that any upswing is followed by a down-
swing, politicians were not able to use the past few
years to cut government spending enough to be really
prepared for subsequent budgetary pressures.
However, now that many countries in the world are
sliding into or are already in recession, policymakers
around the world have nevertheless fully embraced
traditional models of stabilization via demand man-
agement. 
From a European perspective, it is troubling that cer-
tain countries such as France and Italy have been run-
ning large deficits even in the past few years. This in
principle is tying their hands in the present situation.
In the light of the acute nature of the financial mar-
ket crisis, the European Commission is willing to
accept a temporary overshoot of the 3 percent deficit
limit as anchored in the Maastricht Treaty.
Nevertheless, it implies that public borrowing and
debt will sharply rise to dangerously high levels in the
coming years. Future governments will face severe fis-
cal constraints, which will necessitate further increas-
es in tax burdens and/or spending cuts to keep public
finances sustainable in the long run. When such future
taxes are recognized by private agents, this in turn
might reduce the effectiveness of current fiscal stim-
uli, as people could decide to save their additional dis-
posable income to provide for future taxes. 
Whereas monetary policy is decisive when it comes to
stabilising the financial system, it seems to have
become less effective in stimulating the real economy.
The general loss in confidence and the emergence of
severe credit constraints in parts of the world have
made the transmission of monetary policy weaker
and more uncertain. With a drop in credit and the
emergence of constraints, so the argument goes,
increasing public spending and granting tax relief
should sustain demand, hence production and
employment. The global nature of the crisis and the
fact that most economies have become quite open to
trade strongly motivate the implementation of co-
ordinated fiscal intervention.
First of all this assumes that fiscal stimulus pack-
ages are temporary and effective. History shows that
packages financed by additional state spending tend
to be difficult to reverse. In its recent economic out-
look, the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008)
analysed the effectiveness of anti-cyclical fiscal poli-
cies. It reached the conclusion that while discre-
tionary fiscal policy interventions could certainly
help to dampen the impact of recessions, this was
only the case if the economic situation was properly
understood and the additional state spending was
clawed back at a later date, which is certainly not
guaranteed. Automatic stabilisers such as unem-
ployment insurance (whose expenditure increases
during a crisis, while rising revenues are recorded
during the recovery phase) are generally more effec-
tive ways of stimulating the economy. The current
crisis could consequently present an opportunity to
structure automatic stabilisers more effectively,
without this resulting in a permanent rise in the
ratio of government expenditure to GDP. To make
packages easily reverseable, governments can also
focus on already planned growth-promoting invest-
ments in education, research and infrastructure and
decide to implement them earlier rather than creat-
ing new projects. 
The next presumption is that governments need to
counteract quickly and vigorously the emergence of
a dangerous market co-ordination failure in the
economy, consisting in the running dry of credit
markets. If the problem is to jump start an economy
that is sliding into this coordination failure, the size
and timing of the intervention is important. The
package needs to be large and implementation rapid.
Especially with investment projects, where normally
considerable planning is required, this is not always
easy to realise.
Depending on the constitutional set up, cutting taxes
can be implemented on relatively short notice.
However, the experience of the US economic stimu-
lus package in the second quarter of last year is
sobering with respect to its effectiveness. Only a
small part of the rebate was used by households to
increase consumption. The money mostly went into
savings or to repay outstanding debts. Without the
tax rebate, it is likely that consumption would have
sunk moderately in the second quarter. Given thelarge drop in the third quarter, it restrospectively
looks like it would have been better to have had the
rebates in that quarter instead – if at all. This again
highlights one problem associated to discretionary
fiscal policy: the timing. 
Krugman (2008) strongly argues for a massive stimu-
lus package in the United States, proposing the fol-
lowing back-of-the-envelope calculation: assume that
the natural rate of unemployment in the United States
is approximately 5 percent. By Okuns’s law, every
point of unemployment above the natural rate corre-
sponds to a 2 percent output gap (the difference
between current and potential output). If unemploy-
ment were to rise to 8.5 percent, for instance, the out-
put gap would be about 7 percent. How much fiscal
stimulus is needed to close this gap? The answer to
this question depends on the output multiplier effects
of fiscal interventions. 
Even with a multiplier close to 2, the required inter-
vention should be as high as 4 percent of GDP, that is,
about 600 billion dollars. However, a multiplier close
to 2 is likely to be an exaggeration. General transfers
to the public are not likely to translate into substantial
increases in aggregate demand for domestic goods
and services due to precautionary savings and import
leakages. More in line with estimates in the literature
would be a multiplier of around 1, thereby almost
doubling the required size of the intervention. 
Such an intervention may in principle turn out be too
large ex post. Krugman argues that this would not be a
problem, as far as macroeconomic conditions are con-
cerned: monetary policy can always tighten and correct
the mistake. However, it should be recognized that by
transferring resources to households, future taxes and
therefore tax distortions will likely increase. Too large a
fiscal stimulus in the form of transfers to households
entails a social cost in terms of higher future distor-
tions even if its stimulating effect on the economy is
neutralized by monetary contraction. Unfortunately,
what monetary policy cannot be expected to do in the
present situation is to compensate for fiscal policy if
this is too contractionary. “Fiscal policy should take
risks in the direction of boldness.”
While many are now focusing on size, it is important
not to lose sight of basic conditions under which fis-
cal policy is most likely to succeed. In other words,
there is a risk that an exclusive focus on size may be
insufficient, or perhaps even counterproductive. How
and where to intervene is going to be crucial. In what
follows, we spell out two conditions that are not
receiving sufficient attention.
Making fiscal expansions truly temporary
The effect of a fiscal expansion depends on how the
expansion is financed. This applies not only to the
short-term debt-tax mix used to finance a current
increase in government expenditure, but also – and
perhaps even more importantly – to the long-term
financing source, i.e., taxes versus spending cuts in the
future. The impact of an increase in current expendi-
ture can be strengthened in the latter case, that is, if
complemented with a credible plan ensuring that its
cost will be at least in part financed by a reduction in
expenditure at some point in the future. This is the case
for two reasons. The first is derived from an important
lesson of both Keynesian and neoclassical models,
that future spending cuts tend to reduce the long-term
interest rate. This in turn will have positive effects on
current consumption and investment decisions. The
second reason is that a commitment to lower future
spending reduces the overall tax burden of the expan-
sion. For both reasons, future spending cuts will help
contain the negative effects on spending plans by firms
and households that are currently not credit-con-
strained and therefore immediately respond to long-
term fiscal decisions. 
Admittedly, a commitment to reduce spending in the
future may lack credibility, especially in a situation
like today, when the uncertainty about the length and
the overall fiscal implications of the crisis is enor-
mous. Even in countries with explicit fiscal rules (like
the United Kingdom), one may doubt if these provide
sufficient commitment devices. 
It may nonetheless pay to identify measures that are
inherently temporary, i.e., matched by future cuts in
spending. An obvious example consists of measures
that bring forward in time planned investment pro-
jects thereby raising current spending, while simulta-
neously reducing future spending. This is of course no
perfect solution to the problem of commitment but
matches the attributes of the temporary fiscal expan-
sions we are arguing for.
The argument in favour of such policy applies with
unusual force for some countries. The main issue is
that while the cost of fiscal rescue is highly uncertain,
it is likely to raise public liabilities in a substantial
way. It is hard to expect that the impact of fiscal
expansions will be the same across countries with
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very different initial budgetary conditions – Italy ver-
sus France. Empirical work supports this view. Based
on a sample of OECD countries, for instance,
Corsetti et al. (2008b) clearly find that the response
of consumption to increasing government spending
is much lower and even negative in economies with
high debt and deficits relative to economies with bet-
ter initial conditions. 
In countries that are currently burdened by high pub-
lic debt and problematic fiscal conditions, the design
of spending and tax interventions that are truly tem-
porary is likely to be a prerequisite for their effective-
ness.
An example of a type of fiscal policy that is more like-
ly to be successful is tranfers from the central govern-
ment to local governments that are facing severe
reductions in tax revenues. Local governments are
often constrained in their abilities to borrow when the
tax base falls cyclically. There is therefore a risk that
local government consumption becomes procyclical,
leading to lay-offs when the economy turns into reces-
sion. Even if some countries arguably should have a
falling trend in government consumption, now is a
bad time to lay off public-sector employees. Transfers
to local governments in fiscal distress is therefore like-
ly to be a quite cost effective way of stabilizing
employment in the times ahead. A way of making
sure that these transfers are temporary is to construct
a system where the central government guarantees
local tax revenues calculated on the potential (cycli-
cally adjusted) tax base, rather than the actual.
Accompanying fiscal expansion with accommodating
monetary policy
As argued by, for example, Corsetti et al. (2008a), fis-
cal policy is more effective if monetary policy is
accommodative. In other words, for fiscal stimulus to
work, central banks should not adhere too narrow-
mindedly to their mandate of price stability – a criti-
cism often raised against the Bank of Japan in the
“lost decade”. This risk is hopefully small today, as
there is widespread awareness about the severity of
the crisis.
Nonetheless, one could envision a situation in which,
even if policy interest rates were brought close to zero,
it would still be possible that the overall monetary
stance of the economy remains too tight. In this situ-
ation, the lower bound of zero for nominal interest
rates – while providing a rationale for a fiscal expan-
sion – may at the same time limit the effectiveness of
fiscal intervention of a given size. 
A closer look at the mechanism
In what follows, the argument in favour of future
spending cuts and accommodating monetary stance is
illustrated using the results of an exercise based on a
standard new-Keynesian model. The goal is to track
the macroeconomic consequences of an unexpected
increase in government spending in an economy
which is otherwise undisturbed (Corsetti et al. 2008a).
Of course, government spending can mean a lot of
different things (infrastructure investment, public
employment, etc.) and governments are now dis-
cussing policy interventions in response to a strong
deterioration of the overall macroeconomic condi-
tions rather than an exogenous policy change which
would be news to the economy. Yet the purpose of the
exercise is to show to what extent the transmission of
fiscal policy through the real economy depends on the
financing mix and an accommodating monetary
stance. The mechanism is illustrated for the case of an
open economy which, for simplicity, is assumed to be
small. Also the exercise assumes away credit-con-
strained agents, whose presence would increase the
consumption multiplier above what is reported. 
Figure 1.31 shows the evolution of government con-
sumption, private consumption, output, the govern-
ment budget balance and debt, the real exchange rate,
inflation and interest rates over 40 quarters in
response to an increase in government spending by
one percent of (quarterly) GDP. All variables are
expressed relative to their trend values (note that a
negative value for the nominal interest rate means a
fall relative to the initial value). Quantity variables are
expressed as a percentage of quarterly GDP; the real
exchange rate is measured in percentage deviation rel-
ative to its pre-intervention value; interest rates and
inflation are measured in annualized percentage
points. Each graph includes three lines. The yellow
line refers to a spending shock that is entirely financed
by taxes (such taxes may be levied today or in the
future – this is irrelevant here given that taxes are non-
distortionary and that households and firms are not
credit-constrained). The blue and red lines refer to a
spending shock that is partly financed by cuts in
spending in the future: in the upper left panel this
becomes apparent from government spending falling
below trend about 3 to 4 years after the initial mea-
sures were taken. The red lines refer to the case of no
monetary accommodation as the central bank pur-sues complete price stability; the blue lines to the case
of accommodative monetary policy – in the sense that
central banks adopt a Taylor Rule with a relatively
low coefficient on inflation.
The message from Figure 1.31 is unequivocal: the
response of consumption is positive for the “right
mix”of accommodative monetary policy and financ-
ing by spending cuts in the future, but negative either
when spending is entirely financed through higher
taxes (the yellow lines) or when the monetary reac-
tion is non-acccommodating (the red lines).
Comparing the difference in the response of con-
sumption and output across monetary stances
(accommodating, not accommodating), one can
observe a gap of about half a percentage point of
GDP through many quarters.
Monetary accommodation is measured by the differ-
ence in the response of real interest rates depicted by
the blue and the red lines in the lower right panel (ex
ante real rates): under the accommodating stance (red
lines) real rates are lower by about a quarter of a per-
centage point (annualized) relative to the tight mone-
tary stance (blue lines). Importantly, under the
“right” policy mix the path of real short-term interest
rates implies a fall in the long-term real interest rate,
because future short rates fall
below their long-term average
value. 
A new item for international 
policy coordination?
Looking at the results of the
exercise above, one could express
concern regarding real exchange
rate depreciation that, in the exer-
cise, accompanies fiscal expan-
sion cum monetary accommoda-
tion. Depreciation may be seen as
an unwelcomed beggar-thy-
neighbour effect of domestic
policies – by which domestic eco-
nomic activity is sustained by
“stealing” foreign demand. 
Irrespectively of whether spill-
overs from exchange rate move-
ments are negative (a matter of
considerable debate), we stress
here that exchange rate deprecia-
tion will be contained, or elimi-
nated altogether, when fiscal expansion is co-ordinat-
ed across borders. The main conclusions from the
analysis can be in fact applied also at a global level:
for the world as a whole, fiscal policy is most effective
when implemented with the right financing and mon-
etary policy mix. 
As an independent item in an agenda for internation-
al policy co-operation, these considerations could
actually contribute to the success of the joint fiscal
initiative. Countries should be aware of the benefits
from pursuing fiscal plans where current expansions
are partly matched by offsetting correction of spend-
ing in the future. 
5.2 Monetary policy
As compared to other major central banks in the
world, the reaction of the European Central Bank has
been relatively modest. As the problems in Europe
associated with the banking crisis initially appeared to
remain isolated within the banking sector itself, the
ECB restricted its attention to the supply of liquidity
on the money markets. Furthermore, the upsurge in
inflation kept the ECB from cutting interest rates for
a long time. Only until the banking crisis reached new
levels in autumn and started to obviously infect other
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parts of the economy as well, were interest rates cut
by a total of 225 basis points up to January this year.
Although this was only done in four steps and within
a historically short period of time, the reaction of the
ECB was clearly not as bold as that of the Swiss
National Bank, the Bank of England or the Federal
Reserve. Whereas it can be argued that the domestic
situation in the United Kingdom and the United
States required larger steps, this is certainly not the
case for Switzerland. 
Given that the ECB has a reputation of being more
prudent, the question is whether or not additional
steps can be expected. As in previous EEAG reports
(2007; 2008), we use Taylor Rule estimates to put the
most recent actions of the ECB in its own historical
perspective and to analyse whether additional steps
are to be expected, given its own past behaviour. The
Taylor Rule assumes that central banks seek to keep
expected output and inflation close to their target
rates. To capture growth and inflation expectations,
we use consensus forecasts as published monthly by
Consensus Economics Inc. as employed by, for
instance, Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008).
Figure 1.32 shows the implied probabilities when
using the estimated Taylor Rule to predict the likeli-
hood of interest rate changes to be made at the next
ECB governing council meeting. Given that since
October last year, 12-months-ahead inflation expecta-
tions have been continuously falling and economic
growth forecasts really plummeted, the implied target
rate as estimated by the Taylor Rule has sharply
decreased and at the end of the year stood close to
zero, which is well below the level of the actual main
refinancing rate. Accordingly, the probability that we
will see further interest cuts by the ECB is still at a his-
torically high level and basically equals one.
Hence, we do not expect the interest rate cut of
January 15 to have been the last. An interesting ques-
tion is whether all euro area member countries prefer
to see the same cuts. That would be the case if busi-
ness cycles within the euro area were highly synchro-
nised. Whether the introduction of the euro ten years
ago has caused business cycles to synchronise overall
is still strongly debated. At the time the move towards
one currency was discussed, many argued that busi-
ness cycles in Europe were not synchronised enough
to label it an optimal currency area. If economic situ-
ations differ too much between member countries, a
single monetary policy cannot be adequate for all
countries at the same time. Frankel and Rose (1998),
however, put forward the influential idea that business
cycle convergence would almost automatically emerge
once the common currency were in place. Over time,
the euro area would become an optimal currency
area. Now that the euro is celebrating its tenth
anniversary, we have opted to use our Taylor Rule
framework to shed light on the question whether the
euro area is indeed a self-enforcing optimal currency
area.
To do so, we need to compare actual interest rates as
set by the ECB with what would have been optimal for
each member country if it were still able to set its own
interest rate. We assume that the counterfactual mon-
etary policy rule of national central banks is similar to
that of the ECB. That allows us to use the parameters
found when estimating the Taylor Rule for the euro
area for each individual country.5
Using country-specific growth
and inflation expectations, we
can create counterfactual coun-
try-specific policy rates and com-
pare these with actual ECB
rates.6 Hence, for each member
country we have hereby con-
structed a measure that summa-
rizes the inflation and growth
cycle situation relative to the euro
Figure 1.32
5 For more details as to how this is done,
we refer to the 2007 EEAG report and
Sturm and Wollmershäuser (2008).
6 To be sure that structural differences in
growth and inflation have not driven our
results, we substract the average of each
country policy rate differential first.
Hence, by construction the country-spe-
cific cyclical policy rate differential is zero
on average.area aggregate. In a next step we aggregate this coun-
try-specific information to the euro area level and
thereby create a single indicator for business and infla-
tion cycle synchronisation as relevant for the mone-
tary authorities.7
Figure 1.33 shows our convergence measure. A higher
value implies that inflation and growth cycles differ
more between euro area member states. Obviously,
sometimes it is easier for the ECB to conduct a com-
mon policy suitable for all member countries than at
other times. For instance after 9/11, all countries were
hit to a similar extent as the shock was of a purely
international and exogenous nature. However, that
does not appear to be the case at present. Whereas rel-
ative to other countries, Ireland and Spain would
presently prefer stronger cuts in interest rates, the
opposite situation prevails in Austria, Belgium,
Finland and Greece. Although all euro member coun-
tries have been hit by the economic crisis, the differ-
ences between implied target rates vary more widely at
present than at any time during the past. This does
not appear to be an artifact of
last year. There seems to be a
more general upward trend in
this divergence measure. Hence,
growth and inflation cycles seem
to diverge over time.8
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Figure 1.33
7 This aggregation consists of two steps. In the first step, we for sim-
plicity assume that misalignments in upswings are as bad as in down-
swings and hence take the absolute values of the implied policy rate
differences. In the second step, we have to decide what weights we
want to attach to each individual member country. From a positive
point of view, the primary objective of the ECB is price stability.
This has been defined by its Governing Council to imply a year-on-
year increase of the HICP for the euro area that does not exceed 2
percent in the medium term. The euro area HICP is basically a GDP-
weighted average of the country-specific harmonised consumer price
indexes. Hence, if we assume that decision-making in the ECB
Governing Council always results in policy decisions that maximise
the welfare of the whole monetary union, i.e. the members of the
council take a truly euro area perspective, we should use GDP shares
to weigh the individual country policy rate differentials as well.
8 This result is robust with respect to different weighting schemes.
Whether we use equal weights or weights based upon the number of
representatives in the ECB Governing Council does not affect these





GDP growth, inflation and unemployment in various countries





in% 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
EU27 34.5 1.1  – 1.2 0.5 3.6 1.6 1.8 7.0 8.1 8.6
Euro Area 25.0 0.9  – 1.4 0.3 3.3 1.2 1.5 7.5 8.7 9.4
Switzerland 0.9 1.8  – 0.5 0.6 2.4 0.6 1.4 3.5 3.7 4.2
Norway 0.8 2.6 1.0 1.2 3.6 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.9 2.8
Western and Central
Europe 36.2 1.1  – 1.1 0.5 3.6 1.6 1.8 6.9 8.0 8.5
US 28.2 1.3  – 1.0 0.0 4.3 0.3 1.3 5.7 7.5 7.5
Japan 9.0 0.2  – 0.8 0.4 1.4  – 0.2 0.0 4.1 4.5 4.4
Canada 2.9 0.7  – 0.3 1.1 2.5 1.3 1.6 6.1 7.0 6.8
Industrialised 
countries total 76.3 1.1  – 1.0 0.3 3.6 0.9 1.4 6.1 7.3 7.5
Newly industrialised
countries
Russia 2.6 6.3 2.0 3.5
China and
Hongkong 7.1 9.4 7.5 7.5
India 2.2 7.0 6.0 6.2
East India
a) 5.2 4.5 3.0 3.2
Latin America
b) 6.5 4.2 3.1 3.3
Newly industrialised
countries total 23.7 6.4 4.6 4.9
Total
c) 100.0 2.3 0.3 1.4
World trade, volume 3.2 0.5 1.5
a) Weighted average of Indonesia. Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Weighted
with the 2006 GDP levels in US dollars. – 
b) Weighted average of Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico,
Peru, Venezuela. Weighted with the 2006 GDP levels in US dollars. – 
c) Sum of the listed groups of countries.
Weighted with the 2007 GDP levels in US dollars.. – 
d)Standardised unemployment rate.
Source: EU; OECD; IMF; National Statistical Offices; 2008, 2009 and 2010: forecasts by the EEAG.EEAG Report 2009 46
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Table A.2 








in% 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Germany 19.7 1.3 – 2.2 – 0.2 2.8 0.9 1.4 7.3 7.8 9.0
France 15.4 0.8 – 1.2 0.3 3.2 1.0 1.5 7.8 8.4 9.3
Italy 12.5 – 0.4 – 1.5 0.2 3.5 1.3 1.3 6.8 7.8 8.2
Spain 8.5 1.2 – 1.6 0.3 4.2 1.8 1.8 11.2 16.5 17.1
Netherlands 4.6 1.9 – 0.7 1.0 2.2 1.5 1.7 2.8 3.2 3.4
Belgium 2.7 1.2 – 0.8 0.7 4.5 1.6 1.7 7.1 7.2 7.5
Austria 2.2 1.6 – 0.5 0.8 3.3 1.3 1.5 3.8 4.2 4.5
Greece 1.9 3.0 0.8 1.5 4.3 2.2 2.7 7.8 8.1 8.4
Finland 1.5 2.0 0.0 1.3 3.8 2.0 2.1 6.4 7.0 7.1
Ireland 1.5 – 1.7 – 1.7 1.5 3.2 1.1 1.8 6.3 7.8 7.8
Portugal 1.3 0.5 – 0.6 0.5 2.7 1.2 1.5 7.7 8.6 8.9
Slovakia 1.3 7.0 3.2 4.5 3.9 2.8 3.7 9.6 11.1 10.8
Slovenia 0.3 4.5 1.0 1.8 5.8 2.0 2.8 4.5 5.0 5.2
Luxembourg 0.3 2.5 – 0.4 1.7 4.2 1.8 2.1 4.4 4.7 4.9
Cyprus 0.1 3.7 1.0 1.8 4.4 2.1 2.5 3.8 3.9 4.0
Malta 0.0 2.4 0.7 1.6 4.6 2.0 2.6 5.8 6.2 6.4
Euro area
c) 72.8 0.9 – 1.4 0.3 3.3 1.2 1.5 7.5 8.7 9.4
United Kingdom 16.6 0.8 – 1.5 0.3 3.7 2.1 2.2 5.6 7.2 7.5
Sweden 2.7 1.0 – 0.5 1.4 3.4 1.7 1.9 6.2 6.8 7.0
Denmark 1.8 0.2 – 0.8 1.2 3.6 1.6 1.8 3.5 3.6 3.9
EU 19
c) 94.0 0.9 – 1.4 0.4 3.4 1.4 1.7 7.1 8.4 9.0
Poland 2.5 5.4 2.0 3.0 4.2 3.1 3.6 7.1 7.7 7.5
Czech Republic 1.0  4.4 1.7 3.5 6.3 2.4 2.9 4.5 5.3 5.1
Romania 1.0 7.5 3.0 4.5 7.9 4.0 4.5 5.9 6.4 6.4
Hungary 0.8 1.5 – 1.0 1.0 6.1 3.6 4.0 7.9 9.0 9.5
Lithuania 0.2 3.6 1.2 – 1.0 11.1 8.5 7.7 5.6 5.9 6.7
Bulgaria 0.2 6.0 3.0 4.0 12.1 7.3 8.5 5.8 6.1 6.4
Latvia 0.1 – 1.0 – 3.0 1.0 15.4 12.4 11.9 7.1 9.2 9.6
Estonia 0.1 – 1.3 – 1.9 1.2 10.7 8.8 8.3 5.8 9.0 9.5
EU 8 6.0 4.8 1.6 2.9 6.3 3.8 4.3 6.4 7.1 7.1
EU 27
c) 100.0 1.1 – 1.2 0.5 3.6 1.6 1.8 7.0 8.1 8.6
a) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
b) Standardised unemployment rate. – 
c) Sum of the listed
countries.
Source: EUROSTAT; OECD; IMF; 2008, 2009, 2010: forecasts by the EEAG.EEAG Report 2009 47
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Table A.3 
Key forecast figures for the euro area
2007 2008 2009 2010
Percentage change over previous year
Real gross domestic
product 2.6 0.9 – 1.4 0.3
  Private consumption 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.3
  Government consumption 2.3 1.8 1.2 1.3
  Gross fixed capital
formation 4.2 1.0 – 5.5 0.5
  Net exports
a) 0.3 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.2
Consumer prices
b) 2.2 3.3 1.2 1.5
Percentage of nominal gross domestic product
Government fiscal balance – 0.6 – 1.3 – 2.7 – 3.5
Percentage of labour force
Unemployment rate
c) 7.4 7.5 8.7 9.4
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous
year). – 
b) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
c) Standardised
unemployment rate.
Source: Eurostat; 2008, 2009 and 2010: forecasts by the EEAG.Appendix 2:
Ifo World Economic Survey (WES)
The World Economic Survey (WES) assesses world-
wide economic trends by polling transnational as well
as national organisations on current economic devel-
opments in their respective countries. This allows for
a rapid, up-to-date assessment of the economic situa-
tion prevailing around the world. In 2008, 1,001 eco-
nomic experts in 92 countries were polled. The WES
is conducted in co-operation with the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. The survey
questionnaire focuses on qualitative information:
assessments of a country’s general economic situation
and expectations regarding important economic indi-
cators. It has proved to be a useful tool, since it reveals
economic changes earlier than conventional business
statistics. 
The individual replies are combined for each country
without weighting. The grading procedure consists in
giving a grade of 9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5
to indifferent replies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative
(–) replies. Overall grades within the range of 5 to 9
indicate that positive answers prevail or that a major-
ity expects trends to increase, whereas grades within
the range of 1 to 5 reveal predominantly negative
replies or expectations of decreasing trends. The sur-
vey results are published as aggregated data. The
aggregation procedure is based on country classifica-
tions. Within each country group or region, the coun-
try results are weighted according to the share of the
specific country’s exports and imports in total world
trade.
The Ifo World Economic Climate Index fell in
October 2008 to the lowest level for more than
20 years (60.0; 1995=100). The decline is primarily the
result of more unfavourable assessments of the cur-
rent economic situation, but also the expectations for
the coming six months have continued to worsen.
World economy: Global downswing
The world economic climate continued to deteriorate
in October 2008. On a global average, the assess-
ments of the present economic situation fell in
October clearly below the satisfactory level. The eco-
nomic expectations for the next six months have
again been downgraded. The economic downturn
has clearly become global. This time the cooling of
the Ifo World Economic Climate has not only affect-
ed the major economic regions – North America,
Western Europe and Asia – but also Central and
Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin America and
Australia. In October, the economic expectations in
the US brightened somewhat for the third time in
succession. However, the assessments of the present
economic situation in the US have been strongly
down-graded. In Western Europe the economic cli-
mate indicator has again declined in nearly all coun-
tries. In particular, the assessments of the current sit-
uation clearly worsened. The economic expectations
remained pessimistic. In Asia, the assessments of the
current situation deteriorated as well. The six-month
outlook for the Asian economy remains on low level,
too. Particularly unfavourable appraisals of the eco-
nomic situation have been given in Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan. 
Overall, the data confirm a global recessionary trend.
At present, it appears realistic, that the economic cli-
mate index will remain in a recessionary period for
the first half of 2009. In many countries, the WES
experts stated that insufficient demand has become
the major economic problem at present. However,
there are also supportive factors for the global econ-
omy, such as the falling oil and energy prices, easing
inflation, declining interest rates and the multiple
governmental economic stimulus programs in the
US, Western Europe and Asia. The downward pres-
sure for the global economy is still the weak con-
sumption sector in the US and the unprecedented
spread of the financial crisis with its unpredictable
impact on the global economy. 
Western Europe: Strong economic decline 
The economic climate indicator for Western Europe
further deteriorated in October. Particularly the
assessments of the present economic situation have
been strongly downgraded. The economic expecta-
tions remained negative. 
For the euro area the overall economic climate index
strongly declined. In almost all countries of the euro
area the assessments of the present economic situa-
tion deteriorated in October, particularly strong in
Italy, Belgium, France, Austria and Germany. In
Ireland and Portugal the assessments of the present
economic situation remain particularly low. The eco-
nomic expectations have been seriously downgraded
in both countries. In the other countries of the euro
area, the economic expectations for the next
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six months remained pessimistic. WES experts in all
euro area countries expect a pronounced economic
weakening in the beginning of 2009. They named
“insufficient demand”as the most important econom-
ic problem at the present.
Outside the euro area the economic climate index also
fell in October. In Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Switzerland and the UK the assessments of the pre-
sent economic situation further deteriorated in
October; the present economic situation in Switzer-
land and Norway was still regarded as good by the
surveyed economists. In Sweden and Denmark the
present economic performance declined after
October, when it was still described as satisfactory. In
the UK, in contrast, the present economic perfor-
mance is described as very weak. Also here, WES
experts emphasised that “insufficient demand” is
aggravating the economic downturn as a consequence
of the financial crisis. Further economic slow-down is
expected in these countries in the next six months. 
North America: Economic climate index falls 
further
The economic climate indicator in North America
deteriorated in October. However, unlike the other
regions, the economic expectations for the next six
months have been up-graded somewhat in the US. But
the assessments of the present economic situation dete-
riorated strongly, reaching the historically lowest level
since the introduction of WES in 1983. Lack of confi-
dence in the government’s economic policy was named
by the surveyed economist as the most important eco-
nomic problem at present. The October survey was
launched before Barack Obama won the presidential
election. 
In Canada both the assessments of the present eco-
nomic situation and economic expectations have been
downgraded. 
Central and Eastern Europe: Economic cooling 
The economic climate cooled also in Central and
Eastern Europe. The assessments of the present eco-
nomic situation strongly deteriorated in October,
although remaining close to the satisfactory level, on
average. The economic expectations for the next six
months have been downgraded again and are pointing
to lower economic growth rates in the near-term. 
The economic climate deteriorated in all EU countries
of the region. However, the present economic situa-
tion is still assessed as satisfactory or favourable in
most countries, except Hungary, Latvia and Estonia.
The economic expectations have been downgraded in
all new EU countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovenia and Slovakia) and point to economic
cooling in the next six months. 
The economic climate deteriorated somewhat also in
the three countries surveyed outside the European
Union – Albania, Croatia and Serbia – due to a down-
grade of economic expectations for the next six
months. However, in all three countries the assess-
ments of the present economic situation were even up-
graded somewhat in October compared to the July
survey. The surveyed WES experts described the pre-
sent economic performance as satisfactory in
Albania, Croatia and Serbia. An economic deteriora-
tion has been forecasted for the next six months by the
surveyed economists in Croatia. In Albania and
Serbia the economy is expected to stabilise at the cur-
rent level, according to WES experts.
CIS: Economic climate index drops
The overall economic climate index for CIS countries
covered by WES (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) dropped sharply in
October. Both components of the economic climate
index – the assessment of the present economic situa-
tion and economic expectations – have been strongly
downgraded. 
The economic climate deteriorated particularly
strongly in Russia. The assessments of the present
economic situation have been sharply downgraded.
However, the surveyed economists described the cur-
rent economic performance as satisfactory, whereas
the economic expectations for the next six months
have become clearly pessimistic. Russia is expecting a
decline in global demand for its primary exports of
goods. Also credit-driven private consumption and
business investments are expected to weaken in the
coming months. As an important economic problem
the surveyed economists named high inflation. For
the Ukraine even higher inflation was reported. The
present economic situation here has been described
as weak by the surveyed economists. Further eco-
nomic deterioration has been forecasted for the com-
ing months. Lack of confidence in government’s eco-nomic policy is, according to WES experts, the most
important economic problem in the Ukraine at pre-
sent. In contrast, a stable economic climate prevails
in Kazakhstan. The present economic situation con-
tinues to be satisfactory here. The surveyed econo-
mists expect further moves to economic stabilisation
in the next six months. Also in Uzbekistan a
favourable economic climate prevails, according to
WES experts, however, this is not the case in
Kyrgyzstan, where the present economic perfor-
mance remains weak. 
Asia: Economic climate deteriorates
Similarly, in Asia the economic climate strongly dete-
riorated and has fallen to the lowest level since 2001.
Both the assessments of the present economic situa-
tion and economic expectations for the next six
months have again been downgraded for the region, in
October. 
The economic climate index fell further in all major
Asian economies except Pakistan, where the eco-
nomic expectations have been up-graded somewhat.
However, the present economic performance in
Pakistan is judged by WES experts as being very
weak, although it is not expected to deteriorate fur-
ther in the course of the next six months. The pre-
sent economic performance was assessed in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan far below the satisfactory
level and much worse than in the preceding quarter.
In Japan and South Korea further economic deteri-
oration is expected by the WES experts, with pro-
nounced weakening of the capital expenditures and
private consumption. In Taiwan the surveyed econ-
omists expect the economy to stabilise at the current
level, although exports have been forecasted to
decline in the next six months. Lack of confidence
in the government’s economic policy was named as
an important economic problem by the surveyed
economists in Taiwan. The economic climate index
deteriorated strongly also in China. Export growth
is foreseen to weaken strongly in the next six
months. The economists also emphasised that
domestic demand is insufficient in China at present.
Further economic deterioration is expected also in
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. However, the
present economic situation in Malaysia is still
assessed as “satisfactory” by the majority of sur-
veyed economists. Satisfactory was also the assess-
ment of the present economic performance in Hong
Kong, Singapore and the Philippines by the WES
experts. However, also here the prospects appear to
be rather clouded. Particularly in Hong Kong and
the Philippines WES experts expect that capital
expenditures, private consumption and the export
sector will weaken strongly in the course of the next
six months. 
In India the economic climate also cooled somewhat
but not considerably. The present economic situation
here was assessed as being satisfactory in October.
The economic expectations for the next six months
have been downgraded only slightly, pointing to a
moderate economic cooling. Inflation poses the most
important economic problem at present. The same
applies to Vietnam, where the assessments of the pre-
sent economic state have been even up-graded some-
what over the preceding July survey. The expectations
point to an economic stabilisation in the next six
months. Private consumption is even expected to pick
up somewhat. Bangladesh was one of the few coun-
tries where the surveyed economists assessed the pre-
sent economic state as above satisfactory. Although
inflation is also here one of the main economic top-
ics, the overall economic expectations are positive,
pointing to a strengthening of capital expenditures
and the export sector in the course of the next six
months.
Oceania: Economic slowdown continues
Economic slowdown continues in Australia. For the
first time since 2001 the assessments of the present
economic situation slipped below the satisfactory line.
The economic expectations point to a further eco-
nomic cooling in the next six months. Growth of cap-
ital expenditures and private consumption are expect-
ed to decline strongly. The export sector, however,
remains buoyant, according to WES experts. Also
inflation, which is generally easing on a global aver-
age, remains an important economic problem in
Australia.
In New Zealand, the economic climate index
improved somewhat in October over the July survey.
However the present economic situation is still
assessed as far below the satisfactory level. The eco-
nomic expectations for the next six months have
been up-graded somewhat but are still generally cau-
tious. Lack of international competitiveness and
inflation continue to be the country’s most impor-
tant economic problems at present, according to
WES experts.
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Latin America: Economic weakening
The global economic weakening has also reached
Latin America. The economic climate index fell in
October in Latin America as a whole. However,
diverging economic trends still predominate in the
region. 
The present economic situation continues to be
favourable, according to the surveyed economists, in
Brazil, Chile, Panama and Paraguay. However, the
economic expectations for the next six months here
have been strongly down-graded, as in Latin America
in general, and point to a pronounced economic cool-
ing. Private consumption, capital expenditures and
the export sector are expected to weaken in the near-
term. Also in Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and
Uruguay the present economic performance received
high marks on the WES scale. However, the econom-
ic expectations for the next six months have also
become generally cautious. In Argentina and
Colombia the economic expectations have also dete-
riorated, although the present economic state was
assessed as satisfactory in October. In Argentina,
inflation and lack of confidence in government’s eco-
nomic policy were named as the most important eco-
nomic problems at present. Far below the satisfacto-
ry level is how the surveyed economists described the
present economic state in Bolivia, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela. The
economic expectations in all these countries point to
an economic weakening in the next six months, par-
ticularly relating to capital expenditures and private
consumption. 
Near East: Economic climate cools moderately
The economic climate has also cooled somewhat in
countries surveyed in the Near East. However, in the
majority of countries the present economic situation
continues to be assessed similarly favourable, so in
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates. The economic expectations point to a mod-
erate cooling in the next six months and a generally
stable economic performance. In contrast, a pro-
nounced economic deterioration is expected by the
surveyed economists in Israel; although, currently the
economic performance is assessed as above the satis-
factory level here as well. In Turkey, the assessments
of the present economic situation have been strongly
downgraded. The economic expectations for the next
six months have remained cautious, although the
export sector is expected to rebound somewhat.
Further economic deterioration is expected by the
surveyed economists in Iran. Also in Lebanon eco-
nomic recovery remains subdued, according to WES
experts. 
Africa: Economic downturn in South Africa
The economic climate index improved somewhat in
South Africa in October over the July survey. Both the
assessments of the current economic situation and
economic expectations for the coming six months
have been upgraded slightly. The present economic
situation is now assessed close to the satisfactory level.
However, the economic expectations, although less
pessimistic than in the preceding surveys of 2008, are
still pointing to further economic deterioration in the
next six months. Capital expenditures, private con-
sumption and the export sector are expected to weak-
en further in the coming months, according to WES
experts. Unemployment, lack of skilled labour and
inflation continue to be the country’s most important
economic problems, crime and AIDS are the coun-
try’s most important social problems at present.
An economic deterioration is also expected by the
WES experts surveyed in the North African countries,
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria, as well as in
Tanzania, Nigeria and Mauritius. In Kenya, however,
the surveyed economists expect a strengthening of the
economy in the next six months, with growing private
consumption and exports. 
Fewer and fewer economists assess the economy for
WES in Zimbabwe. Many of them have left the coun-
try or have no access to communication media. The
information that reaches us reflects that the disastrous
economic and political circumstances continue to pre-
vail in the country and may even further aggravate in
the near term. EEAG Report 2009 52
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